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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Calder have adequate notice of the charges against 
him in light of the scope of the allegations set forth in formal 
complaints, F-253 and F-274? 
2. Is the application of Section 48-21-15 of the Motor 
Vehicle Code relevant to the misconduct of Calder in his 
representation of Bailey? 
3. Are the Disciplinary Hearing Panel's Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendation of Discipline merely advisory or 
will such findings only be set aside if arbitrary, capricious or 
unsupported by substantial evidence? 
4. Are the Findings of Fact of the Disciplinary Hearing 
Panel based upon substantial evidence in the record? 
5. Did the Disciplinary Hearing Panel err by failing to 
find any mitigating factors in its Recommendation of Discipline? 
6. Is the recommendation of disbarment disproportionate 
given that the Disciplinary Hearing Panel found no fewer than 
fifteen (15) violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar, no mitigating circumstances and several 
aggravating circumstances? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about February 16, 1989, a Disciplinary Hearing Panel 
[hereinafter referred to as "Panel"] comprised of Robert 
Stansfield, Chair, Richard Makoff and Molly Sumner recommended 
that J. Richard Calder be disbarred from the practice of law in 
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the State of Utah. That recommendation concluded five (5) days 
of trial held on November 14 and 15, 1988, December 2, 3 and 20, 
1988, and January 23, 1989. During the trial Special Bar 
Counsel, David E. Leta, represented the Office of Bar Counsel, 
Utah State Bar. The Board of Bar Commissioners [hereinafter 
referred to as "Board"] adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Recommendation of the Panel on March 24, 1989. 
Thereafter, Calder filed with the Board a timely objection to the 
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation. A three-member panel 
of the Board comprised of James Clegg, James Davis and Hans 
Chamberlain conducted a five-hour hearing on Appellant's 
Objections after which it recommended to the Board that the 
Panel's recommendation of disbarment be affirmed. The Board 
adopted the three-member Hearing Panel's Recommendation and 
accordingly entered its Order. Calder now appeals the Board's 
Order as well as the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation of Discipline by the Panel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts set forth in Calder's Brief are almost exclusively 
fashioned from Calder's testimony and merely put forward Calder's 
characterization of the evidence. Respondent therefore sets 
forth the following facts consistent with the findings of the 
Panel. The misconduct of Calder resulting in a recommendation of 
disbarment involves two clients, Larry Bailey and Dennis Job; the 
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conduct of Calder as set forth below clearly establishes a 
pattern of conduct which subordinates the interests of his 
clients to his own interests in making a living. 
A. Bailey: F-274 
Bailey, a truck driver for 22 years, retained Calder in 1978 
to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on his behalf. In hiring 
Calder, Bailey expected that he would receive a discharge in 
bankruptcy of a judgment debt incurred as a result of an 
automobile accident along with a discharge of his other debts. 
The debt was related to property damage suffered by Richard and 
Moena Harris in the sum of $1,400. The discharge of the debt was 
a primary reason for Bailey filing bankruptcy. Calder failed to 
list that judgment debt on Bailey's bankruptcy schedules; as a 
result, Bailey did not obtain a discharge of that indebtedness. 
Tr., 27-29; 31-33; 305. 
After filing the Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Bailey attempted to 
renew his driver's license and was informed by Utah Department of 
Motor Vehicles personnel that unless he could prove that the 
judgment debt had been discharged or satisfied he could not renew 
his driver's license. Tr., 35-36. So, Bailey went back to 
Calder to obtain "proof" of the discharge of the judgment debt. 
Calder, relying on Bailey's representation that he could not 
renew his driver's license without proof of the discharge, sent a 
letter on behalf of Bailey to the Department of Motor Vehicles 
indicating that the debt was discharged. The Department would 
not accept the letter as sufficient proof of the discharge. 
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Bailey then obtained the bankruptcy schedules at which time he 
discovered the debt had not been listed and was not discharged. 
Tr., 29; 35-37; Exhibit B-4. 
Bailey again went back to Calder to have him correct the 
omission by amending the schedules to include the debt. As as 
result, Calder, on or about March 28, 1979, filed an Application 
for Leave to Amend Bailey1s bankruptcy schedules. In that 
application, however, Calder misidentified the judgment creditor. 
Consequently, on August 21, 1979, when Bailey received the 
discharge in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the correct judgment debt 
was still not listed and therefore not discharged. Bailey was 
again unable to renew his driver's license. Between 1979 and 
1983, Bailey contacted Calder to determine if his bankruptcy 
schedules had been amended. Calder represented to Bailey that he 
was working on the matter and sent Bailey a letter to that effect 
in January 1982. Tr., 37-38; 43; Exhibit B-5, B-8, B-ll. 
Frustrated that his schedules were still not properly 
amended, Bailey complained to the Utah State Bar in 1983. As a 
result of the complaint, Jeff Paoletti, then Bar Counsel, 
intervened and Calder agreed to take the necessary steps to amend 
the schedules, add the omitted judgment and obtain the discharge. 
Calder agreed to accomplish these objectives if Bailey would pay 
to him the sum of $10.00. Bailey paid the $10.00 to Calder as 
requested. Paoletti's understanding of Calder's agreement to 
represent Bailey was memorialized in a letter sent to Bailey on 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 4 
October 19, 1983. Tr., 45-46; 121-128; 315; 324-326. Exhibits 
B-12, B-13. 
Subsequently, Calder discovered that the bankruptcy case had 
been closed and the files forwarded to central filing in Denver, 
Colorado. Calder then informed Bailey that he would need an 
additional $120 for attorney's fees and costs to amend the 
schedules and obtain the discharge. Bailey again contacted the 
Utah State Bar to complain about the additional fees. Jeff 
Paoletti again intervened and discussed the matter with Calder. 
Calder, based on his communication with Paoletti, agreed to go 
forward for an additional sum of $15.00. Thereafter Bailey paid 
to Calder the $15.00. Tr., 48-51; 124-125; Exhibit B-17. 
Without any further demand for additional fees, Calder filed 
the Motion to Reopen on or about January 12, 1984. That Motion, 
Calder admitted at trial, was incomplete and was not sufficient 
to effect the objective sought by Bailey. Calder made no effort 
to supplement that Motion or indicate to the court that he 
intended to supplement it. Tr., 335; 529. Exhibit B-18; B-19. 
On or about February 15, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court sua sponte 
denied the Motion to Reopen. On February 16, 1984, immediately 
upon learning of the dismissal, Calder withdrew as Bailey1s 
counsel. Calder took no further steps to correct the Motion to 
Reopen or achieve the desired objective of discharging the 
judgment debt. Tr., 335; Exhibits B-19, B-20. 
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Finally, in 1984, Bailey hired Paul Van Dam, who correctly 
filed the appropriate motion to reopen and amend the schedules. 
The schedules were amended and the judgment debt discharged. 
Bailey eventually renewed his driver's license in 1988. Tr., 
56-61. In the interim, between 1984 and 1988, Bailey suffered 
extreme emotional distress, could not obtain a driver's license 
and was unable to secure steady employment. Tr., 60-61. 
In 1986, Bailey filed a malpractice action against Calder 
styled Bailey v. Calder, No. C86-800, Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. During the pendency of that 
malpractice action, Calder signed and filed an affidavit in that 
malpractice action. In that affidavit Calder swore under oath 
that he had not represented Bailey since 1978 and had only 
attempted to help Bailey amend his bankruptcy schedules "at the 
request of the Bar." Calder filed that affidavit intending that 
the trial judge would rely on his statements. Calder admitted at 
the disciplinary trial that those statements in the affidavit 
were false. His motive in doing so was to escape responsibility 
to Bailey for his failure to obtain a discharge of the judgment 
debt. Tr., 336-340; Exhibit B-26. 
B. Job: F-253 
In 1983, Dennis Job retained Calder to file a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy on Job's behalf. Job had been involved in the 
baseball industry all his life and had a franchise in Salt Lake 
City. At the time Job sought Calder's assistance, Job was 
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experiencing financial difficulties necessitating bankruptcy. 
Job, at that time, was also a litigant in a federal court lawsuit 
involving one of the baseball franchises and the franchise 
contract. The lawsuit claimed damages in excess of $1 million, 
[the lawsuit hereafter will be referred to as the "Pocklington 
suit"]. Tr., 140-142. 
Job wanted to discharge his debts but retain an interest in 
the Pocklington suit. Job testified at trial that he informed 
Calder of the Pocklington suit, told him how important it was to 
him and that he did not want the filing of bankruptcy to affect 
his ability to pursue the Pocklington suit. Job even gave Calder 
the case name and case number of the Pocklington suit. Tr., 143; 
200. 
Calder advised Job that he could file a Chapter 7 and that, 
in all likelihood, the trustee would abandon the Pocklington suit 
as an asset and Job could continue prosecuting the Pocklington 
suit. Relying on that advice, Job consented to the filing of the 
Chapter 7. Tr., 143-145. When Job's Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
schedules were prepared, however, the Pocklington suit was not 
listed as an asset. Calder, however, contended at trial that it 
was listed; Job recalls seeing the asset on the working papers he 
reviewed. The bankruptcy schedules filed with the court clearly 
show, however, that the Pocklington suit was not listed. 
Though Calder testified at the disciplinary trial that Job 
did not give him enough information about the Pocklington suit, 
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he now "readily" admits in his brief to this Court at page 11 
that he did not "take reasonable steps and precautions to insure 
that this cause of action was properly scheduled and listed." 
Tr., 145-146; Job Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Schedules. Despite that 
admission now, Calder previously filed an affidavit in a 
malpractice action against him by Job wherein Calder asserted 
that the omission of the Pocklington suit was a result of Job 
stealing a key to his office, surreptitiously entering it and 
changing the schedules; Calder also asserted that his secretary 
had changed the schedules or that someone at the bankruptcy court 
changed the schedules. Exhibit B-50. 
After Job's Chapter 7 was closed and while the Pocklington 
suit was pending, the opposing counsel discovered that the 
Pocklington suit had not been listed as an asset in Job's 
bankruptcy case. Counsel filed a Motion to Reopen Job's Chapter 
7 to list the Pocklington suit as an asset and cause a trustee, 
rather than Job, to administer the asset. The Motion also 
charged Job with perjury and fraud for failing to list the 
lawsuit. It was at this time that Job first learned that the 
Pocklington suit had not been listed in his bankruptcy schedules. 
Job confronted Calder about the omission and asked him to resist 
That malpractice action was filed September 11, 1984 and 
styled Job v. Calder, C84-5436, Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
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the Motion to Reopen. Instead, Calder suggested that Job file a 
Chapter 13 petition and consent to the reopening of the Chapter 
7. Though not happy with that recommendation because Job did not 
have "regular income" and did not believe he would qualify for a 
Chapter 13, Job accepted Calderfs advice and paid additional fees 
to file a Chapter 13. Tr., 147-153. 
At that point, Job was not comfortable with Calder's 
representation and only wanted to resist the Motion to Reopen to 
clear his name. Job discussed with Calder the consequences of 
failing to attend the 341 meeting of creditors; Calder advised 
him that the Chapter 13 would be dismissed without prejudice. 
Not wanting to proceed with the Chapter 13, Job did not attend 
the 341 meeting. Rather than the Chapter 13 being dismissed 
without prejudice, however, the trustee moved to dismiss the 
Chapter 13 with prejudice and revoke the Chapter 7 discharge. 
Tr., 153-158; 439. 
Upon learning of the trustee's intention to file a Motion to 
Dismiss, Calder filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw. At the 
time Calder filed this Motion, he did not advise Job that the 
trustee had filed a Motion to Dismiss and that it would be 
noticed up for hearing in the near future. Calder also did not 
attempt to protect Job's interests or to prevent prejudice to his 
client due to his withdrawal. Tr., 439-440; 160. 
Job was unable to retain counsel prior to the hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss and attended the hearing without counsel. At 
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the hearing, Job consented to the dismissal of his Chapter 13 
case. The trustee's Motion to revoke the discharge under the 
Chapter 7 was granted and the Chapter 7 case was vacated. As a 
result, Job found himself in exactly the same position with his 
creditors as he was when he first retained Calder. In addition, 
however, at this juncture, he was also facing a pending 
foreclosure on his home and was without income or prospective 
income. Tr., 161-163. 
Job then sought to retain counsel to file a Chapter 11 
petition to preclude foreclosure on his residence. Because he 
was unable to timely pay the required attorney's fees, however, 
he could not retain counsel. Job filed the Chapter 11 petition 
pro se several minutes after the foreclosure sale on his home had 
been conducted. Tr., 168-170. Thereafter, and during the 
pendency of the Chapter 11 case, Job settled the Pocklington suit 
for a small payment from the defendant, then sought and obtained 
a dismissal of his Chapter 11 case. Tr., 170-171. 
Just prior to filing the Chapter 11 case, Job filed a 
malpractice action against Calder. During the pendency of 
malpractice action, the Chapter 11 was dismissed. Prior to the 
trial on Job's malpractice lawsuit, Calder filed a Motion to 
Re-open Job's Chapter 11 bankruptcy, alleging that Job committed 
fraud, that he had engaged in tax evasion, that he omitted income 
from his schedules and that Calder himself was an unscheduled 
creditor, even though Calder had never sent Job a billing nor 
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advised him of any outstanding fees that were due* In fact, 
Calder had no factual basis for the Motion and it was denied. 
Tr., 172-174; Tab 43 of Bankruptcy Folder, No. 84C02521. 
Thereafter, a trial was held on Job's malpractice action. 
On January 10, 1986, Judge Frederick made findings on the record 
and awarded Job a judgment against Calder in the sum of $55,000. 
Between that date and January 30, 1986, Calder transferred 
certain assets to his wife and brother. He also amended his then 
pending personal Chapter 13 bankruptcy to include Bailey but not 
Job as a creditor. Tr., 175; 400-403. 
Importantly, Calder had not previously disclosed to Bailey, 
Job or Judge Frederick that he had filed a personal Chapter 13 in 
March 1984 which was still open and pending. Calder had not 
amended the Chapter 13 case to include Job as a creditor. On 
February 24, 1986, however, at the hearing to approve the form of 
Judge Frederick's findings and to have the malpractice judgment 
entered, Calder's counsel informed the court of his pending 
Chapter 13 case and asserted for the first time in the 
malpractice case that the automatic stay precluded the court from 
entering the judgment. Judge Frederick refused to stay the 
proceedings at that point and entered the judgment. Tr., 176; 
Exhibit B-36. 
Thereafter on March 12, 1986, Calder filed another Chapter 
13 bankruptcy. The 1984 Chapter 13 case was not yet closed. In 
that 1986 Chapter 13 filing, Calder listed assets significantly 
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less than those listed in his 1984 Chapter 13. Judge Allen 
dismissed the March 1986 Chapter 13 filing as a bad faith filing 
pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss filed by Job. Job also moved to 
dismiss the 1984 Chapter 13 as a bad faith filing and, again, 
Judge Allen granted the Motion. Calder filed appeals of those 
decisions but did not post any supersedeas bond. The dismissals 
are now final and non-appealable. Tr., 176-180; 747-750; 
Exhibits B-37 and B-38. 
In August of 1986, Calder filed a Chapter 7 in an effort to 
preclude Job from executing on his judgment. Job then sued 
Calder in the Chapter 7 matter, requesting that Calder be denied 
a discharge. After a trial, on September 27, 1988, Judge Allen 
issued a memorandum decision denying Calder a discharge and 
finding by clear and convincing evidence that Calder had 
knowingly and fraudulently prepared his schedules. Calder then 
filed an appeal of that decision and for the first time posted a 
supersedeas bond to preclude Job from executing on the 
malpractice judgment.2 Tr., 179-180; 184; 789-790; Exhibit B-39. 
C. Conclusion: 
Based on Calder's conduct as outlined in the Findings of 
Fact, the Panel concluded that Calder committed no less than 
Denial of a discharge terminates the automatic stay and, 
without the bond, Job would have been able to pursue collection 
of the malpractice judgment. 
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fifteen disciplinary rule violations including misrepresentation, 
dishonesty, harassment of clients, conduct adversely reflecting 
on fitness to practice, neglect, intentional failure to carry out 
a contract of employment, intentional prejudice of a client's 
interests, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, 
and taking action in a legal matter to harass or injure. See 
Conclusions of Law 1 and 2 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Recommendation of Discipline, pp. 15-20. 
The Panel made additional findings in aggravation of that 
sanction and found that Calder displayed a dishonest and selfish 
motive in his attempts to cover his mishandling of the Job and 
Bailey matter; that Calderfs conduct continued over a decade; 
that Calder contradicted himself on many occasions to avoid 
responsibility for his conduct; and that the clients were 
particularly vulnerable since they were seeking assistance in 
such a highly specialized area of law. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Discipline, pp. 20-22. 
Based on those myriad disciplinary rule violations and the 
factors found in aggravation, the Panel recommended and the Board 
affirmed that Calder should be disbarred from the practice of law 
in the State of Utah. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Board of Bar Commissioners has recommended that J. 
Richard Calder be disbarred from the practice of law in the State 
of Utah. That recommendation of disbarment is based on findings 
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of fact and conclusions of law which are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. Calder, however, attacks the finding for 
several reasons. 
First, Calder challenges the findings regarding his personal 
bankruptcies, which were filed in 1984, March 1986 and August 
1986, as being outside the scope of the underlying formal 
complaints. The formal complaints involving Larry Bailey (F-274) 
and Dennis Job (F-253) were consolidated for purposes of the 
disciplinary trial. The formal complaint in F-253, in 
particular, specifically alleges facts relative to Calder*s 
personal bankruptcies. The findings of the Panel with regard to 
those personal bankruptcies are related either to Calderfs 
misconduct with respect to Job and Bailey or factors pertinent to 
the recommended sanction. In any event, Calder did not object to 
evidence and testimony regarding his personal bankruptcies and, 
in fact, himself gave extensive testimony on those issues at the 
trial. Based on that, Calder has impliedly consented to the 
trial on those issues. 
Second, Calder claims that the findings with respect to the 
Bailey matter (F-274) are flawed because they are based on a 
misapprehension of § 48-21-15 of the Motor Vehicle Code. That 
code provision was not considered nor interpreted by the Panel in 
reaching its findings and is irrelevant to the misconduct of 
Calder. Calder, assisting Bailey in amending his bankruptcy 
schedules to include the omitted Harris judgment debt, relied on 
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Bailey's representations that the Department of Motor Vehicles 
would not renew his driver's license unless that judgment debt 
was either satisfied or discharged in bankruptcy. Never did 
Calder advise Bailey that amending the schedules to include that 
judgment debt would not enable him to renew his driver's license. 
Indeed, Calder did not introduce evidence to that effect at the 
disciplinary trial, nor did he raise the application of 
§48-21-15. He is now precluded from raising that issue. 
Third, Calder asserts that the findings, conclusions and 
recommendation are advisory only and that the findings are 
erroneous. The disciplinary case law fashioned by this Court 
clearly sets forth that findings and recommendation of discipline 
by the Board will be presumed to be correct unless a showing is 
made that they are arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by 
substantial evidence. The findings in the instant case are based 
on substantial and, oft times, uncontroverted, evidence in the 
record. That evidence is specifically noted in the discussion of 
each particular finding infra. 
Next, Calder suggests that the Panel erred by failing to 
consider factors in mitigation when fashioning the sanction. The 
record is clear that the Panel took and considered evidence 
relative to mitigation but found that no mitigating factors were 
established by that evidence. Calder's three factors in 
mitigation, which he argues were erroneously excluded, presuppose 
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that the Panel found its own findings to be erroneous. The Panel 
did not so find and did not err in excluding those factors in 
mitigation. 
Finally, Calder argues that the recommendation of disbarment 
is disproportionate. Disbarment is not disproportionate given 
that Calder was found to have violated no less than fifteen (15) 
disciplinary rules, that he generally has a selfish motive in 
relation to his clients1 best interests and that he 
misrepresented assets and in bad faith filed three (3) personal 
bankruptcies. The Panel also found that Calder is unable to 
conform his conduct as a lawyer to even the minimum standards of 
the profession. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ISSUES TRIED BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING PANEL WERE 
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST CALDER 
AND/OR WERE WITHIN THE IMPLIED SCOPE OF THE COMPLAINTS. 
Calder complains that the circumstances surrounding his 
personal bankruptcies - two Chapter 13 cases filed in 1984 and 
1986 and a Chapter 7 case filed in 1986 - were beyond the scope 
of the allegations raised in the two formal complaints. That 
argument ignores the fact that the allegations of the 
consolidated formal complaint did, in fact, specifically allege 
conduct related to Calder's personal bankruptcies; that the 
evidence presented at trial without objection gives rise to an 
amendment of the pleadings to conform to that evidence; and that 
the evidence was relevant to Calderfs state of mind, to his 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 16 
credibility and the credibility of Job's and Bailey1s testimony, 
to the issue of Calder1s competence, and to the issue of 
sanctions. 
A. ALLEGATIONS OF THE FORMAL COMPLAINTS 
Two formal complaints were filed against Calder: F-274 
filed October 23, 1987, as a result of an initial complaint by 
Larry Bailey, and F-253 filed February 6, 1987, as a result of an 
initial complaint by Dennis Job. Those two formal complaints 
were consolidated on October 4, 1988, for purposes of trial. See 
Order of Consolidation dated October 4, 1988. The Bailey Formal 
Complaint (F-274) alleged violations of no less than seven 
disciplinary rules focusing on Calderfs failure to adequately 
remedy the omission of a judgment debt in Bailey's original 
bankruptcy filed in 1978 after Calder agreed in 1983 to undertake 
3 
further representation of Bailey for that purpose. 
The Job Formal Complaint (F-253) alleged nine disciplinary 
rule violations, seven of which are the identical to those 
The disciplinary rule violations alleged in F-274 are 
briefly as follows: (1) Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); (2) 
Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness 
to practice law); (3) Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); (4) Canon 
6, DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without adequate 
preparation); (5) Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect); (6) Canon 7, 
DR 7-101(A)(2) (intentionally failing to carry out a contract of 
employment); and (7) Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3) (intentionally 
prejudicing or damaging client's interest). 
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alleged in the Bailey Formal Complaint ; the allegations in the 
Job Formal Complaint focus on Calderfs failure to adequately 
remedy the omission of an asset in Job's bankruptcy schedules. 
In addition, the factual allegations in the Job Formal Complaint 
specifically reference Calder's personal bankruptcies filed up to 
1986 as those bankruptcies relate to his misconduct. See Job 
Formal Complaint, F-253, paragraphs d, e, g, h, i. Those 
allegations in pertinent part set forth (1) Calder's failure to 
inform Job or Judge Frederick of his pending 1984 Chapter 13 
bankruptcy until after Judge Frederick awarded Job a malpractice 
judgment in the sum of $55,000; (2) Calder's transfer of assets 
after Judge Frederick orally rendered the malpractice judgment 
but prior to entry of the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment; (3) 
Calder's second Chapter 13, filed on March 12, 1986 and its 
subsequent dismissal for bad faith by Judge Allen; (4) the 
dismissal of Calder's 1984 bankruptcy for bad faith; and (5) 
Calder's filing of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy in August 19, 1986, 
listing 900 of his clients as creditors. At trial, Special Bar 
Counsel produced evidence as to those enumerated factual 
allegations and the relationship of that conduct to Job's and 
The two additional rule violations are: (1) Canon 7, DR 
7-101(A)(1) (intentionally failing to seek objectives of client) 
and (2) Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(1) (taking a position merely to 
harass or injure). 
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Baileyfs representation and the resulting disciplinary rule 
violations. The Formal Complaints clearly put Calder on adequate 
notice both as to the nature and the scope of the issues. 
B. IMPLIED CONSENT TO AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS 
Rule XII(b) of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah 
State Bar provide that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
evidence applicable to non-jury civil trials govern disciplinary 
trials. Consequently, Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure applies to the disciplinary trial conducted in the 
instant case. Rule 15(b) permits an implied amendment of 
pleadings to conform to the evidence. Further, in the context of 
a disciplinary case, it has been held that Min the absence of any 
objections to evidence on an issue raised by the pleadings, the 
party failing to object has impliedly consented to the amendment 
of the pleadings to conform to the evidence." In Re Sedillo, 84 
N.M. 10, 315 P.2d 837 (1972). In Sedillo, the complaint failed 
to allege the attorney's wrongful retention of money. The 
attorney offered no objection to the evidence offered on that 
issue and cross-examined witnesses concerning the alleged 
wrongful retention. 
In the instant case, Calder participated in all five days of 
trial over a two-month period; he offered only one objection to 
all of the evidence concerning his personal bankruptcies. That 
objection was to the introduction of a Memorandum Decision and 
Order dated September 27, 1988, wherein Judge Allen denied Calder 
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a discharge for fraudulently omitting certain assets from his 
bankruptcy schedules. Exhibit B-39. The Panel admitted the 
Judge's Order noting that conduct of an attorney, which is part 
of the total course of action of that attorney, may continue 
after the filing of the complaint and as long as the evidence of 
such conduct is directly related to the dispute complained of, 
the evidence is admissible. Tr., 181-183. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Calder claims he is somehow 
prejudiced by any implied consent to matters involving his 
personal bankruptcies. Yet the record reflects that not only did 
he fail to object to the introduction of evidence relating to his 
bankruptcies but he also chose not to engage in any discovery 
prior to the trial. Calder had ample opportunity to engage in 
pre-trial discovery since the formal complaints had been pending 
since February 19, 1987, and October 27, 1987. Had he done so, 
he could have discovered the specific evidence and arguments to 
be introduced by the Office of Bar Counsel at trial. In 
addition, Calder in his own defense offered his own testimony and 
cross-examined witnesses on the issue of his personal 
bankruptcies. 
Even at this juncture, Calder has not shown that he did not 
have a "fair opportunity to defend" nor that he "could offer any 
additional evidence if the case were to be retried on a different 
theory." Such a showing is required by the test cited by Calder 
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at page 23 of Appellant's brief and as set forth at 3 MooreTs 
Federal Practice, Section 15.13[2] at 15-131(1989)• 
C. EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO STATE OF MIND, CREDIBILITY AND 
SANCTION 
Finally, the evidence and findings with respect to Calderfs 
personal bankruptcies are relevant for three (3) other reasons: 
state of mind, credibility and sanctions. First, as to state of 
mind, Calderfs conduct in his own bankruptcies clearly evidenced 
his conduct and attitude toward Job and Bailey as clients. 
Calder's conduct in his personal bankruptcies impacted Job and 
Bailey in their efforts to have Calder take responsibility for 
his inadequate and incompetent representation of them in their 
own bankruptcies. For example, Calder did not attempt to have 
Jobfs malpractice claims listed as liabilities in his pending 
1984 Chapter 13 bankruptcy until after he knew Job was awarded a 
5 
substantial judgment of $55,000.00. Calder then began to use 
his personal bankruptcy proceedings to preclude Job from 
executing on that judgment. Calder first asked Judge Frederick 
in the February 1986 hearing in the malpractice action to stay 
further proceedings. Judge Frederick refused. Then on March 12, 
1986, one month after the malpractice judgment, Calder filed a 
Calder filed his Chapter 13 in March 1984; Job sued Calder 
for malpractice in September 1984. Calder never raised an issue 
about the automatic stay until February 1986 at the hearing on 
entry of the malpractice judgment. 
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second Chapter 13 to obtain an automatic stay; that Chapter 13 
was dismissed as a bad faith filing. In the meantime, Calder 
appealed Judge Frederick's malpractice judgment to the Utah 
Supreme Court. This Court denied that appeal. Calder then filed 
a personal Chapter 7 on August 16, 1986; Judge Allen denied a 
discharge in that Chapter 7 in September 1988. Having exhausted 
all other avenues of stopping execution on the Job malpractice 
judgment, in November 1988, Calder posted a supersedeas bond of 
$55,000 in connection with his appeal of the denial of discharge 
in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Tr., 176-180; 184; 747-750; 
789-790; Exhibits B-37 through B-39. From these actions, the 
Panel could reasonably conclude that Calder was misusing the 
bankruptcy process to avoid responsibility to a client. 
Second, as to credibility, Calder?s carelessness and 
incompetence in his own bankruptcies to properly list assets, 
file the appropriate bankruptcy forms and properly use the 
bankruptcy process supported the testimony of Job and Bailey that 
Calder negligently and carelessly prepared and followed through 
on their bankruptcies. Where Calder was directly controverting 
Job's and Bailey's testimony of his negligence and carelessness, 
evidence that Calder was negligent and careless in his own 
bankruptcies goes to establishing the credibility of Job's and 
Bailey's testimony and was properly admitted by the Panel. 
Finally, the findings of fact made by the Panel must support 
not only the conclusions of law found by the Panel but must also 
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support the enumerated factors relative to the recommended 
sanction. When a Panel considers factors relative to sanctions, 
the Panel considers not only the offenses at issue but also 
"matters independent of the specific offense but relevant to 
fitness to practice.11 ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions, § 9.1. The Findings of Fact with respect to Calder's 
personal bankruptcies, in addition to proving the factual 
allegations set forth in the formal complaints, support the 
Panel's Factor No. 2 in Aggravation where the Panel found: 
Respondent displayed a dishonest and selfish motive in his 
attempts to cover his inappropriate handling of both the Job 
and Bailey bankruptcies by filing several personal 
bankruptcies in bad faith,... by filing inappropriate asset 
schedules, and in doing so perpetrated fraud, engaged in 
misrepresentations and in misleading conduct with the courts 
and his clients. 
See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of 
Discipline, p. 21. 
In addition, the conclusions of law that relate to Calderfs 
personal bankruptcies are conclusions which relate directly to 
the claims of Bailey and Job; they are not independent of those 
issues. See Conclusions of Law Nos. l.b, d, i and 2b. Those 
paragraphs set forth the Panel's conclusions that Calder's 
conduct in his personal bankruptcies was intended to harass 
and/or injure Job and/or Bailey. While Conclusion of Law No. lc 
does not specifically relate to Job or Bailey, it does support 
aggravating factor No. 2 in that it concludes that Calder's 
filing of disparate asset schedules in his bankruptcies 
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constituted dishonesty and fraud. That factor clearly goes to 
Calder's general fitness to practice which is relevant in 
determining a sanction as previously noted. 
D. SUMMARY 
Calder1s conduct in his personal bankruptcies was 
inextricably connected with the factual allegations and 
disciplinary rule violations set forth in the consolidated Job 
and Bailey formal complaints. Calder defended himself at trial 
without objection to the evidence of his personal bankruptcies. 
That evidence was admitted to establish Calder's general standard 
of practice in filing bankruptcy schedules and to establish the 
credibility of Job's and Bailey's testimony that Calder was 
negligent in filing their bankruptcies just as he was negligent 
in filing his own. Finally, the Panel appropriately considered 
Calder's conduct with regard to his personal bankruptcies in 
reviewing evidence relevant to mitigating and aggravating factors 
to determine an appropriate sanction pursuant to ABA guidelines. 
II. THE APPLICATION OF § 41-12-15 OF THE UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 
IS IRRELEVANT TO THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANEL 
AND TO THE NATURE OF CALDERfS MISCONDUCT. 
Calder argues that the Panel misapprehended the application 
of § 41-12-15 of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act with respect to the 
findings on the Bailey matter. The Panel with regard to the 
Bailey formal complaint, F-274, found the following: that Calder 
omitted a judgment debt from Bailey's bankruptcy schedules; that 
Bailey informed Calder that the Department of Motor Vehicles had 
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denied him a driver's license because that judgment debt appeared 
on his record; that, thereafter, Calder wrote to the Department 
of Motor Vehicles to clear the matter and ultimately agreed to 
assist Bailey in amending his bankruptcy schedules to include the 
omitted judgment debt; and that, in fact, Bailey was unable to 
obtain a drivers license. See Finding No. 1, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Discipline. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the above facts as 
found by the Panel are uncontroverted. At the disciplinary trial 
Calder offered no evidence to refute the fact that Bailey came to 
him unable to renew his driver's license or that Bailey was 
informed by the Department of Motor Vehicles that the outstanding 
judgment precluded him from obtaining a driver's license. In 
fact, Calder acknowledged that Bailey initially came to him 
because of the driver's license problem. The receipt which 
Calder's office gave Bailey for the $10.00 payment in furtherance 
of Calder's agreement to amend the bankruptcy schedules noted 
that it was for the driver's license problem. Tr., 467; Exhibit 
B-13. 
Calder did not offer into evidence the 1979 version of 
§ 41-12-15 of the Utah Motor Vehicles Act. He never contested 
the testimony by Bailey and the conclusions argued therefrom: 
that, in fact, the Department of Motor Vehicles had refused to 
renew Bailey's driver's license because he had a judgment debt on 
his record, which did not appear as being satisfied or discharged 
in bankruptcy. 
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Calderfs uncontroverted conduct belies the very argument and 
interpretation of § 41-12-15 which he presses for the first time 
on appeal. When initially informed by Bailey in 1979 that he had 
been denied a driver's license because the Harris judgment debt 
remained on his record, Calder did not advise Bailey that even if 
the Harris judgment debt were discharged in bankruptcy, that 
discharge would not relieve Bailey from satisfying the judgment 
in order to renew his license. Such advice would have been 
consistent with Calderfs present interpretation of § 41-12-15. 
Instead, Calder agreed that the discharge in bankruptcy would 
correct the problem and, in fact, Calder wrote a letter to the 
Department of Motor Vehicles informing them of the bankruptcy and 
of the discharge so that Bailey could renew his driver's license. 
Calder also took some initial steps to amend Bailey's schedules. 
If these efforts would have been to no avail in light of 
§ 41-12-15, then why was Calder doing them? Obviously, either 
Calder did not understand the law, which is relevant in a 
disciplinary proceeding, or the statute was not being enforced by 
the Department because it was unconstitutional. Exhibit B-4. 
In fact, § 41-12-15 was found to be unconstitutional and 
was amended. Undoubtedly, its unconstitutionality was 
understood, based upon the case of Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 
637 (1971) and was not applied as written. This clearly accounts 
for Calder's conduct in 1979 and 1982/1983, prior to the 
amendment, as consistent with the understanding that, in fact, a 
(Footnote Continued) 
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Subsequently, upon Bailey discovering the debt was not 
listed in his bankruptcy schedules and still being unable to 
renew his driver's license, Bailey went back to Calder for 
further assistance. Receiving no satisfaction, Bailey complained 
to the Utah State Bar. Calder ultimately agreed to further 
assist Bailey in amending his bankruptcy schedule to include the 
omitted debt. At that time, Calder knew that the reason Bailey 
believed he needed the debt included in his schedules was to 
renew his driver's license. Calder then took steps to have 
Bailey's bankruptcy schedules amended. He did not at anytime 
advise Bailey that discharging the debt was useless in attempting 
to renew his license. Tr., 37-38; 43; 48-51; 121-128; 315; 
324-326; 467; Exhibit B-13. 
In any event, the interpretation of the 1979 version of 
§ 41-12-15 is irrelevant to Calder's misconduct. If, in fact, 
amending the bankruptcy schedules to include the discharge of the 
Harris debt would not enable Bailey to renew his driver's 
license, Calder's minimum obligation was to so advise him so 
Bailey could take other appropriate steps to renew his driver's 
license. Instead, Calder agreed to represent Bailey in amending 
(Footnote Continued) 
debt discharged in bankruptcy satisfied an outstanding judgment 
for purposes of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Calder knew 
that § 41-12-15 was not being applied by the Department as he now 
argues, at least at the time of the Bailey malpractice action. 
See Affidavits at App. I. 
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the schedules and failed, as found by the Panel. The Panel's 
conclusion that Bailey was unable to obtain his driver's license 
because of Calder's misconduct is absolutely correct and 
uncontroverted, no matter how § 41-12-15 is interpreted or 
applied. 
III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR 
UNREASONABLE AND ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Calder cites several disciplinary cases for the proposition 
that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation 
of Discipline are merely advisory and should be accorded little 
of the deference normally accorded findings from other agencies 
or tribunals. That assertion is a serious misreading of prior 
disciplinary opinions from this Court. 
This Court has consistently upheld findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in disciplinary cases absent a showing that 
such findings or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, 
unreasonable or not supported by substantial evidence. See, 
e.g., In Re Robert B. Hansen, 584 P.2d 805 (Utah 1978); In Re 
Johnston, 524 P.2d 593 (Utah 1974); In Re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174, 
493 P.2d 1273 (1972); In Re Fullmer, 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 P.2d 343 
(1965); In Re Macfarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631 (1960). 
Though this Court has acknowledged the Court's ultimate 
authority in the discipline of attorneys, this Court has not 
exercised that authority in an arbitrary or inconsistent manner. 
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Rather, this Court has consistently applied sound principles of 
appellate review as is clearly stated in In Re Johnston: 
We are aware that the action of the Bar 
Commission is but a recommendation to this 
court... Nevertheless, this Court has 
declared and reiterated that in considering 
the findings and recommendations of the 
Committee, the Court will indulge them 
with presumption of correctness and 
propriety; and will not disregard or 
overturn them unless something is 
made to appear to persuade the court 
that the Commission has acted capriciously, 
arbitrarily or beyond the scope of its 
powers. 
In Re Johnston, 524 P.2d at 594. (emphasis added). 
This Court has taken somewhat more latitude in reviewing the 
recommended sanction as opposed to the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. On limited occasions the Court has changed 
the recommended discipline without disturbing the findings of 
fact or conclusions of law. See, e.g., In Re Robert B. Hansen, 
supra, 584 P.2d 805. Still, in those instances, the Court has 
articulated the rule that the Board's recommendation will be 
accepted unless arbitrary or capricious. In Re Fullmer, supra, 
405 P.2d 343. 
Appellant cites In Re McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986), for 
the proposition that the findings are merely advisory and not 
entitled to any particular deference. Appellant misreads In Re 
McCune, however, by greatly expanding two sentences of dicta at 
the conclusion of the opinion. See In Re McCune, 717 P.2d at 
709. The Court in McCune acknowledges that the Utah Supreme 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 29 
Court is the body which imposes and authorizes the public 
discipline of attorneys. From that, the Court in McCune simply 
noted that a recommendation of public discipline by the Bar 
Commission is not final until reviewed and entered by this Court. 
McCune did not establish or reestablish the standard of review in 
appeals of disciplinary cases as being merely advisory; in fact, 
the Court in McCune does not even address the issue of the 
standard of review for findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
disciplinary cases. 
To adopt Calder's suggested standard of review would make 
meaningless the considerable effort and time spent by 
disciplinary hearing panels and the Bar Commission. Such a 
standard of review would encourage attorneys to appeal every 
decision of a disciplinary hearing panel since the attorney could 
in every instance reargue his characterization of the evidence on 
appeal. That would make this Court's ability to review a matter 
on the record an almost impossible task. 
In this instance, Calder asserts such a standard of review 
for that very reason: so that by this appeal, Calder can simply 
reargue his characterization of the evidence. Calderfs primary 
attack on the Panel's and the Bar Commission's findings is that 
they rejected his characterization of the facts. Calder's 
Statement of the Case and his many references to the record are 
primarily citations to his own testimony, which are for the most 
part characterization and conclusions. His other references to 
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the record are merely citations to evidence that supports his 
characterization of the evidence. Such an approach shifts the 
burden on appeal to the Bar to marshall the evidence and show 
that the record does in fact support the findings. 
On appeal, a lower tribunal's or agency's decision should 
have the presumption of validity and correctness absent some 
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness. In the instant case, 
Calder is unable to show that the findings are arbitrary or 
capricious. Consequently, Calder is left to merely reargue his 
characterization of the evidence, a characterization which the 
Panel rejected. 
IV. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
IN THE RECORD, EVIDENCE WHICH CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY 
SUPPORTS THE PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION OF DISBARMENT. 
A. MANY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE BASED ON 
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE OR ON THE CLEAR, UNCONTROVERTED 
CONDUCT OF CALDER. 
Calder makes a sweeping argument that the findings of fact 
with respect to the Bailey Formal Complaint (F-253) were 
determined largely by balancing Calder's testimony against 
others' testimony or by the Panel admitting hearsay evidence, 
which hearsay evidence does not meet the Bar's burden of 
establishing its allegations by clear and convincing evidence. 
That argument is simply not supported by the record. Many of the 
Panel's Findings of Fact with respect to the Bailey Formal 
Complaint (F-274) are uncontroverted and largely based on 
Calder's own uncontroverted conduct. The events and 
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circumstances of Calderfs misconduct were established not only by 
testimony but by documentary evidence. 
Calder's testimony conflicts with Paoletti's testimony as to 
the nature of Calderfs agreement to continue representing Bailey. 
Though Calder now insists that he volunteered to assist Bailey in 
amending his bankruptcy schedules to include the omitted Harris 
judgment debt, in a 1983 affidavit filed in the Bailey 
malpractice action, Calder stated that he assisted Bailey at the 
request of Bar Counsel. Exhibit B-26. Paoletti testified that 
after conversing with both Calder and Bailey, Calder agreed to 
represent Bailey and agreed to go forward for a lump sum payment 
of $10.00. Tr., p. 121. In this instance, the Panel determined 
the credibility of testimony by weighing all the evidence, which 
it is entitled to do, including Calder?s uncontroverted conduct. 
Calder did in fact undertake to amend Bailey's bankruptcy 
schedules-; Calder initially accepted $10.00 from Bailey in 
furtherance of that objective; and Calder did in fact file 
pleadings, though inadequate, after accepting the second sum of 
$15.00 from Bailey. Tr., 45-51; 121-128; 315; 324-326; 335; 
Exhibits B-12; B-13; B-17; B-19 and B-20. What Calder attempted 
to controvert through his testimony is uncontroverted by his own 
actions. It is the Panel's duty to consider all the facts; it is 
not bound by Calderfs characterizations. 
In asserting that Paoletti's testimony should not have been 
accepted as credible, Calder emphasizes one part of Paoletti's 
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testimony where Paoletti stated he did not have a clear 
recollection of all of the events. Tr., 121. That testimony is 
taken out of context. Paoletti made that statement in response 
to a specific question about how he became aware of Bailey's 
complaint against Calder. In response to that question, Paoletti 
frankly testified that he did not have a clear recollection as to 
whether the complaint was made by Bailey personally coming to the 
office or by a written letter initially. Tr., 121. Paoletti 
never testified that he did not have a clear recollection as to 
all the events and occurrences. Paoletti testified to the facts 
and events he remembered and noted when his recollection was not 
clear. See, e.g., Tr., 122. Consequently, the Panel clearly 
knew when Paolettifs testimony was based on a clear recollection 
of the circumstances and when it was not. 
The Panel simply rejected Calderfs characterization of the 
facts and events relative to his agreement to amend Bailey's 
bankruptcy schedules. The Panel was not bound by Calder's 
characterizations no matter how clearly he articulated them 
during the course of his testimony. 
In further attacking the findings with respect to the Bailey 
matter, Calder asserts that the Panel's finding that Bailey could 
not renew his driver's license is flawed. Calder argues that the 
finding is based on hearsay evidence. The fact that Bailey could 
not and did not renew his driver's license is uncontroverted. 
Calder did not introduce evidence, advance any argument or refute 
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the assertion that Bailey's inability to renew his driver's 
license was attributable to a circumstances other than the 
undischarged judgment debt. 
Assuming, arguendo, however, that Bailey's testimony 
regarding the Department of Motor Vehicles' refusal to renew his 
license was hearsay, under the Rules of evidence, hearsay is not 
7 
inadmissible per se. The Panel was entitled to consider the 
trustworthiness of the evidence and give it appropriate weight in 
making its findings. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(24). The 
Panel did so. The Panel accepted the testimony under the 
following circumstances: Calder made no objection to that 
portion of Bailey's testimony; no evidence was advanced by Calder 
to controvert it; Calderfs own testimony at trial did not refute 
Bailey's testimony that he was unable to renew his driver's 
license; and Calder attempted to assist Bailey in amending the 
bankruptcy schedules when Calder knew that the reason Bailey 
wanted his bankruptcy schedules amended was so that he could 
renew his driver's license. 
For the most part, the evidence underlying the Panel's 
findings of fact with respect to the Bailey Formal Complaint is 
The case cited by Calder for the proposition that hearsay 
is inadmissible is a 1957 case and does not take into account the 
new rules of evidence and their approach to hearsay. See Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 et. seq. 
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uncontroverted, and certainly is clear and convincing. Calder 
has failed to show that the Panel's admission of evidence or 
reliance on certain evidence in making its findings was 
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Calder has also not shown 
that the findings with respect to F-253 are unsupported by 
substantial evidence in the record. Again, Calderfs arguments 
rest solely on the fact that the Panel rejected Calder's 
subjective characterization of the facts. 
B. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
Calder appropriately acknowledged his duty on appeal to 
marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then to 
demonstrate that the evidence, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the factual determinations, is insufficient to 
support the findings. See generally, Harline v. Campbell, 720 
P.2d 980 (Utah 1986). Although acknowledging that duty, Calder 
fails to marshall the evidence and, in many instances, does not 
even give the appearance of attempting to do so. In attacking 
each of the findings, Calder either does not cite to all the 
supporting evidence in the record or merely complains that his 
characterization of the facts was rejected without disputing the 
actual facts. Calder then merely reargues the evidence and/or 
recrafts the finding and attacks the recrafted finding. Calder's 
arguments suggest that the Panel was bound by Calderfs subjective 
characterizations as set out in Calderfs trial testimony, and 
that, by not accepting those characterizations or at least 
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acknowledging them in the findings, the Panel erred. As will be 
shown, the findings are amply supported by substantial evidence 
in the record. 
1. Finding No. 1(a); 
Mr. Bailey originally retained Respondent to file a 
bankruptcy in 1978. Problems arose in this bankruptcy 
respecting the discharge of a certain judgment debt which 
precluded Mr. Bailey from obtaining a Utah driverfs license. 
Calder claims that the only evidence supporting this finding 
is a brief excerpt from Bailey's trial testimony and that the 
finding is based solely on hearsay evidence. In fact, Bailey's 
uncontroverted testimony was that in 1979, when he was initially 
unable to renew his driver's license, he informed Calder that he 
needed proof of the judgment debt being discharged so he could 
renew his driver's license. Tr., 35-37. Calder admitted at trial 
that Bailey so informed him. Tr., 307. At that time, and 
without actually checking the bankruptcy schedules, Calder wrote 
a letter to the Department of Motor Vehicles indicating that the 
judgment debt had been discharged. Tr, 307-308; Exhibit B-4. 
The Department would not accept the letter. Bailey obtained the 
bankruptcy pleadings at which time he discovered that the 
judgment debt was not listed in the bankruptcy schedules. Tr., 
37-41. Consequently, Bailey went back to Calder to have him 
amend the schedules. Tr., 37-41, 307-311. Calder himself 
acknowledged those events and acknowledged his own efforts to 
amend Bailey's bankruptcy schedules so that the judgment debt 
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could be discharged and Bailey could renew his driver's license. 
Tr., 307-311. In fact, the receipt Calder gave to Bailey for his 
payment of $10.00 recites that the payment is for the driver's 
license problem. Exhibit B-13. The fact that Bailey was unable 
to renew his driver's license is absolutely uncontroverted. 
Further, Calder did not object at the time of trial to 
Bailey's testimony that he was unable renew his driver's license 
as hearsay nor did Calder introduce any evidence that Bailey's 
inability to obtain his driver's license was due to any fact 
other than the omission of the judgment debt from Bailey's 
bankruptcy schedules. As previously noted, Calder's own conduct 
in writing a letter to the Department of Motor Vehicles and in 
subsequently attempting to amend the bankruptcy schedules was a 
result of Calder knowing that Bailey could not renew his driver's 
license otherwise. Tr., 300-311; Exhibit B-13. The record is 
absolutely cleai that everyone, including Calder, proceeded to 
amend the bankruptcy schedules based on Bailey's need to have the 
judgment debt discharged in his bankruptcy case to renew his 
license. Calder's conduct supports that finding; Bailey's 
conduct supports that finding. In fact, Calder never advised 
Bailey that discharging the judgment debt would not enable him to 
renew his driver's license. Rather, Calder agreed to represent 
him in amending the bankruptcy schedules for that purpose. 
Finding 1(a) is supported by substantial, uncontroverted 
evidence in the record. 
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2. Finding No, 1(b): 
In or about October 1983, Respondent entered into an 
engagement with Mr. Bailey, arranged through Bar Counsel, C. 
Jeffrey Paoletti, to resolve an investigation of a 
disciplinary complaint filed by Mr. Bailey against 
Respondent. By this engagement, Respondent agreed that he 
would obtain an amendment to Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy 
schedules and obtain a discharge for Mr. Bailey of a 
judgment debt owed by Mr. Bailey to Richard D. and Morren C. 
Harris in the sum of about $1,400.00. 
Calder's challenge to this finding is simply an attempt to 
reargue and recharacterize the evidence. He first argues that he 
did not enter into an agreement to represent Bailey in amending 
his bankruptcy schedules but that he "volunteered" to do so. 
Whether Calder "volunteered" to assist Bailejy is totally 
irrelevant. The facts are that Calder agreed to assist Bailey in 
amending his bankruptcy schedules; he filed a legal pleading as 
Bailey's attorney to effect that amendment; and he accepted money 
from Bailey for the purpose of obtaining that amendment. Tr., 
43-51; 121-126; Exhibits B-13 and B-17. Calder's undertaking was 
in fact arranged through Bar Counsel, C. Jeffrey Paoletti. 
Paoletti testified that he had conversations with Calder and 
Bailey; Bailey did not contact Calder nor did Calder contact 
Bailey until after the arrangements were made through Paoletti. 
Tr., 122-125. Contrary to what Calder now argues, in the 1983 
affidavit filed in the Bailey malpractice lawsuit, Calder 
admitted that he undertook Bailey's representation at the behest 
of the Utah State Bar through Bar Counsel. Exhibit B-26. 
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This Finding is accurate, uncontroverted and supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. 
3. Finding No. 1(c): 
Respondent agreed to complete the engagement and achieve the 
objective upon Mr. Bailey's paying $10.00 for additional 
attorney's fees; Mr. Bailey made said payment of $10.00 to 
Respondent. 
In subjectively characterizing the evidence relating to this 
finding at trial, Calder asserted that he did not agree to go 
forward based on a payment of $10.00. However, Calder's own 
conduct belies that characterization. Calder chooses to ignore 
this conduct in his discussion of this finding at Appellant's 
Brief, pages 38-39. 
Calder accepted the $10.00 from Bailey; he did not request 
additional fees before proceeding and he in fact prepared the 
amendment after receiving the $10.00. Tr., 46; 49. Then, on 
November 28, 1983, Calder wrote to Bailey advising him to come to 
the office and sign an amendment to the bankruptcy schedules. 
Calder did not disclose in that letter that he needed additional 
fees to go forward. Tr., 319; Exhibit B-14. Thereafter, Calder 
discovered that the case was closed and the bankruptcy file sent 
to Denver, Colorado. Calder then contacted Bailey and informed 
him that he would not proceed further without additional fees. 
Tr., 48-50; Exhibit B-16. Bailey contacted Paoletti and 
complained that Calder was not completing the agreement and was 
changing the deal. Ultimately, Calder agreed to proceed for an 
additional lump sum payment of $15.00. Tr., 50-51; 124-125. 
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Calder?s conduct amply supports the Panel's finding as does 
Bailey's and Paoletti's testimony. The only dispute with this 
finding is that Calder would have the Panel, and now this Court, 
characterize the evidence differently. 
4. Finding No. 1(d): 
After accepting the engagement and agreeing upon the 
fee to be charged, Respondent demanded additional money from 
Mr. Bailey, in the amount of $120.00, in order to initiate 
the engagement. Mr. Bailey complained to Mr. Paoletti about 
this additional fee. 
The evidence with respect to this finding is also 
uncontroverted. Calder accepted payment of $10.00 from Bailey 
and prepared the Motion to Amend. Calder obtained Bailey's 
signature on the Motion and intended to file it, until he 
discovered that the bankruptcy case was closed. Tr., 48-50; 
124-125. In fact, Calder then demanded an additional $120.00. 
Tr., 50; Exhibit B-16. Bailey complained again to Paoletti. 
Tr., 50-51; 124. 
Calder simply reargues the evidence and objects to the 
"apparent implication" of the finding that Calder acted 
improperly in demanding additional money from Bailey. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 41. The finding itself implies nothing; it 
merely sets forth the facts as supported by substantial, 
uncontroverted evidence in the record. 
5. Finding No. 1(e): 
Subsequent to the October 1983 engagement, numerous 
communications were exchanged between Mr. Bailey and 
Respondent, and between Respondent and Bar Counsel which 
concluded with Respondent reaffirming his agreement to 
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continue representing Mr. Bailey in amending the bankruptcy 
schedules. Mr. Bailey paid an additional $15.00 to 
Respondent, at Respondent's reguest, in furtherance of the 
engagement. 
Calder does not argue that the facts in finding No. 1(e) are 
erroneous but rather that the finding is "misleading" because it 
fails to include his subjective characterization of the evidence. 
Appellant's Brief at p. 41. Again, the facts in this finding are 
undisputed. After demanding the additional $120.00, Bailey and 
Paoletti had two conversations. Tr., 50-52. Then, Paoletti and 
Calder had a conversation, with "the resolution at the end of 
that conversation [being] that [Calder] was to take an additional 
$15.00." Tr., 125. In fact, on or about December 29, 1983, 
Calder did accept an additional $15.00 from Bailey. Tr., 51-52; 
Exhibit B-17. On or about January 12, 1984, Calder, as Bailey's 
counsel, filed a Motion to Reopen Bailey's Chapter 7. Exhibit 
B-18. Neither at the time he accepted the additional $15.00 from 
Bailey nor thereafter did Calder raise the issue of additional 
attorney's fees. Instead, he proceeded with the representation. 
Tr., 51-52; Exhibit B-18; Exhibit B-19; Exhibit B-20. 
The facts are clear, uncontroverted and amply support the 
Panel's finding. The Panel did not err by failing to include 
Calder's characterization of the evidence. 
6. Finding No. 1(g): 
Though Respondent presented conflicting evidence as to 
the agreement, the Panel accepted former Bar Counsel C. 
Jeffrey Paoletti's testimony as the most credible evidence 
of Respondent's agreement to represent Mr. Bailey in 
amending his Bankruptcy. 
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Calder asserts that the Panel erred by accepting Paoletti's 
testimony as the most credible evidence; in doing so, Calder 
mischaracterizes and takes out of context Paolettifs statement 
that he did not have a clear recollection. Paoletti's statement 
at trial that he did not have a clear recollection was, as 
previously noted, in response to the specific question as to how 
Bailey's complaint came to his attention. Tr., 126. Paoletti's 
testimony as to the Calderfs agreement, however, is not 
contradictory. Paoletti's testimony is consistent with Bailey's 
testimony as to the terms of that agreement and amply supports 
the finding. Tr., 121-128. As further evidence of Paoletti's 
credibility, Paoletti's understanding of the agreement was 
memorialized in a contemporaneous letter to Bailey on October 19, 
1983, wherein Paoletti states: 
Mr. Calder did indicate that upon payment of $10, he 
would proceed with the amendment of your schedules and 
final resolution of this matter. 
Exhibit B-12. Finally, Calderfs own conduct is consistent with 
Paolettifs version of the agreement. 
The Panel's duty as the trier of fact is to determine 
credibility. The Panel heard the testimony, observed the 
witnesses and had the opportunity to assess demeanor. Taking 
Paoletti's and Bailey's testimony as a whole along with the 
documentary evidence, it cannot be said that the Panel erred in 
accepting Paoletti's testimony as the most credible evidence of 
Calder's agreement. Paoletti was the only independent witness; 
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he did not have a vested interest in the outcome of his 
testimony. This finding is neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
7. Finding No. 1(h): 
Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen Mr. Bailey1s case, but 
the Motion was inadequate on its face. 
This finding is wholly supported by the record and the facts 
admitted by Calder at the disciplinary trial. Calder admitted 
that the Motion to Reopen was not sufficient to accomplish an 
amendment of the bankruptcy schedules. Tr., 529-530. That was 
certainly born true by the Judge's sua sponte denial of the 
Motion to Reopen. Exhibit B-19. 
Calder argues that the finding is erroneous because it fails 
to "mention . . . the justification advanced by Calder." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 42. The Panel is not required to accept or 
set forth Calderfs "justification." The uncontroverted 
circumstances supporting this finding are clear from the record: 
Calder admittedly filed a Motion to Reopen that was inadequate; 
Calder did not inform the court on the face of the pleading that 
it would be supplemented nor request additional time to 
supplement the pleading, Tr., 529-530; Exhibit B-18; Calder 
received the court's order denying the Motion but made no attempt 
to have the denial set aside so he could submit the additional 
information for which he claimed he was waiting; instead, Calder 
immediately withdrew as Bailey's counsel. Exhibit B-20; Tr., 
52-54. In fact, Bailey learned of the Judge's decision not from 
Calder but from the court. Tr., 52-54. 
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Calder further argues that this finding "cannot support the 
imposition of disciplinary sanctions." Appellant's Brief, p. 42. 
The Panel did not base any conclusion of law nor the sanction on 
this finding alone. The Panel's recommendation is based upon all 
of the findings, including this finding, and the conclusions, as 
a whole, as well as the aggravating factors. 
8. Finding No. l(i): 
After filing the Motion with the Bankruptcy Court, 
Respondent failed to follow through with his representation 
of Mr. Bailey by failing to schedule the Motion to Reopen 
for hearing and by failing to present the Motion to the 
judge for consideration. 
Calder does not attack this finding as being erroneous or 
arbitrary or unsupported by the evidence. The finding as stated 
is accurate and supported by the evidence in the record. See 
Tr., 53-55; 334-335; 529-530. Once again, Calder objects to the 
finding because the Panel did not include Calder's subjective 
characterization of these uncontroverted facts. To argue, 
however, that because subsequent counsel was able to accomplish 
the discharge of the debt Calder was relieved of his 
responsibility begs the question. Calder1s misconduct was that 
he undertook to amend the bankruptcy schedules, did so 
incompetently, without due diligence and in a neglectful manner, 
which required Bailey to hire subsequent counsel. Subsequent 
counsel's ability to have the judgment debt discharged actually 
aggravates Calder's conduct; it is not mitigating. See 
Conclusions of Law No. 1(f) and (g). 
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9. Finding No. l(j): 
The Motion to Reopen was denied, and, immediately upon 
learning of the Court's order, Respondent withdrew from 
representing Mr. Bailey. At no time after February 16, 
1984, did Respondent make any effort to obtain substitute 
counsel for Bailey, return the $10.00 paid by Bailey, refund 
any portion of the original attorney's fees and costs paid 
by Bailey for the Chapter 7, take any steps with the 
Department of Motor Vehicles to assist Bailey obtain a 
driver's license or, in any other way, assist Bailey in 
achieving the desired objective. 
On the whole, this finding is based on uncontroverted facts 
set forth in the record. Calder did withdraw immediately upon 
learning of the court's order denying the Motion to Reopen; the 
denial was issued February 15, 1984 and Calder withdrew on 
February 16, 1984. Exhibits B-19 and B-20. As the finding 
correctly states, Calder made no further effort to ensure that 
his client's interests were protected. Tr., 335. Calder did not 
obtain the amendment and did nothing to help Bailey renew his 
driver's license. Tr., 56; 335. These facts are uncontested. 
What Calder argues, then and now, and what the Panel 
rejected, was that Bailey had the responsibility to contact 
Calder upon his withdrawal to seek further assistance for 
substitute counsel and/or to seek a return of the fees. 
Appellant's Brief at p. 44. What the Panel appropriately 
concluded from those facts and circumstances was that Calder 
withdrew from representation in violation of DR 7-101(A)(2) and 
(3). Conclusions of Law No. l.g. 
Finally, Calder asserts that no duty to refund fees could 
have arisen "because Calder unilaterally volunteered to assist 
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Bailey." That position, as previously asserted, however, is 
absolutely contradicted by Calder's own affidavit prepared and 
filed in the Bailey malpractice lawsuit. Exhibit B-26. Once 
again, Calder is merely attempting to reargue the evidence and in 
doing so asserts contradictory characterizations of the 
uncontroverted facts. 
This finding is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. 
10. Finding No. l(k): 
On or about April 16, 1984, Respondent, being under oath, 
prepared, signed and filed an affidavit in the case of 
Bailey v. Calder, Civil No. C85-80Q, then pending in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, wherein Respondent knowingly and intentionally made 
the following misrepresentations and false statements. 
1) That after Judge Mabey had originally 
granted an application to reopen Mr. Bailey's case, the 
client was "to pay a $60.00 filing fee to the court and 
also a $10.00 fee to add the creditor that he had 
omitted, when, in fact, there was no such financial 
arrangement at that time; 
2) That after 1979, Respondent had not had 
any contact with Bailey until 1982 when, in fact Bailey 
had contacted Respondent on several occasions prior to 
that date; 
3) That Respondent did not represent Bailey 
as his attorney in 1982 inasmuch as Bailey had refused 
to pay anything to Respondent as requested, when, in 
fact, Respondent had written to Bailey in 1982 advising 
Bailey that Respondent was proceeding with his case; 
4) That he had agreed to help Mr. Bailey in 
1983 at the request of the Utah State Bar but that 
nothing more was done because Bailey refused to pay 
money when, in fact, Bailey had paid, in full, all the 
money requested pursuant to the agreement; 
5) That in 1983 he was not representing Mr. 
Bailey because Bailey had not paid his retainer fee and 
had "paid no money to [him]" when, in fact, Bailey had 
paid all fees required under the agreement; and 
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6) That at no time after 1978 had Respondent 
represented Bailey in any bankruptcy matters, when, in 
fact, he had represented Bailey, had advised Bailey 
about bankruptcy matters, and had filed motions for 
Bailey as Bailey's attorney both in 1979 and in 1984, 
The only portions of this finding which Calder attacks are 
subparagraphs (3), (4) and (5). The particular objections raised 
by Calder are minuscule, attempting once again to recharacterize 
the evidence- Calder ignores all the circumstances and 
contradicts his own conduct. 
First, Calderfs assertion that no evidence exists to support 
the finding that Calderfs conduct was knowing and intentional 
clearly indicates that Calder has not made a good faith attempt 
to marshall all the evidence in the record that supports this 
particular finding. Calder's knowledge of facts that clearly are 
contrary to the statements made in his 1983 affidavit is amply 
demonstrated by the documentary evidence received by the Panel. 
In subparagraph (3) the Panel finds that, though Calder 
claimed he did not represent Bailey in 1982, he did in fact 
represent Bailey and he knew it. That is clearly evidenced by 
the letter from Calder to Bailey dated January 26, 1982, wherein 
Calder acknowledges to Bailey that he is continuing on his behalf 
and proceeding with his case. Calder states: "This letter is to 
inform you that we are working on the matter in as speedy a 
fashion as the mail will allow." Exhibit B-ll. In his 1983 
affidavit Calder states the opposite. 
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In subparagraph (4) the Panel finds that Calder 
misrepresented the facts in his 1983 affidavit by claiming that 
he did nothing further for Bailey because Bailey refused to pay 
additional money. Again, Calder knew that he accepted an initial 
$10.00 from Bailey, another $15.00 on December 29, 1983, never 
asking for additional fees thereafter. Exhibits B-13 and B-17. 
After payment of the $15.00, Calder proceeded on Bailey's behalf 
by filing the Motion to Reopen on January 12, 1984. Exhibit 
B-18. 
In subparagraph (5) the Panel again finds that Calder's 
assertion that he did not represent Bailey in 1983 is belied by 
his own conduct and by the relevant documentation. Calder 
prepared a Motion to Reopen and requested that Bailey come to his 
office to sign it. Exhibit B-16. Calder then filed that Motion 
on January 12, 1984, as Bailey's attorney. Exhibit B-18. On 
February 16, 1984, Calder also gave Bailey written notification 
that he was terminating his representation. Exhibit B-20. 
Calder did not assert he was terminating representation because 
Bailey did not pay his fee but because Calder found Bailey to be 
offensive. Exhibit B-20. All of this supports the conclusion 
that Calder represented Bailey. 
From the above facts and circumstances, the Panel inferred 
that Calder knew the correct facts when he prepared and filed his 
1983 affidavit and that the false statements in his affidavit 
were intentional. Inferring intent and state of mind from the 
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circumstances is appropriate as there is often little direct 
evidence as to intent. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bar v. 
Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325 (W. Va. 1988). 
In attacking this finding, Calder does not marshall the 
evidence in support of the finding but, again and again, simply 
reasserts his characterization of the evidence and then points to 
evidence which supports his characterization. To the extent such 
a tactic suggests that the record does not support the finding, 
it is misleading. As the prior discussion points out, the 
Panel's finding is not merely supported by substantial evidence 
in the record but is supported by uncontroverted evidence. 
11. Finding No. l(m): 
When Respondent filed a personal Chapter 13 on February 23, 
1984, he did not list Bailey as a creditor even though, at 
that time, Respondent knew that he was required to list all 
known and contingent liabilities and also knew that Bailey 
probably had a claim against him for his failure to comply 
with the terms of his agreement to achieve the desired 
objective. Respondent did not seek to amend his 1984 
Chapter 13 to add Bailey as a creditor until January 31, 
1986, even though, as early as February 1985 Respondent knew 
that Bailey had filed a malpractice action against him in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Civil NO. C85-800. 
The only portion of this finding objected to by Calder is 
that Calder "knew that Bailey probably had a claim against him," 
which should have been listed in Calderfs personal Chapter 13 
filed on February 23, 1984. Calder suggests that the only 
evidence relating to that issue is four lines quoted from 
Calder's testimony where Calder denies knowing Bailey had a claim 
against him. Tr., 358, 1. 3-9. These four lines of testimony, 
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however, are taken out of context. What Calder fails to point 
out is that he also testified that when he filed his personal 
Chapter 7 in August 1986, he listed over 900 of his former 
clients as creditors who had contingent claims against him, 
claims which Calder admits are of the same type that Bailey had 
in 1984. Tr., 358. Calder testified that in 1986 he was simply 
trying to be careful by listing those 900 clients1 claims. Tr., 
358. The Panel reasonably inferred that if Calder could 
recognize possible claims of clients in 1986 that were the same 
type as Bailey's, Calder could have or should have recognized and 
listed Bailey's claim before January 1986. 
In addition, the evidence of Calder's failure to list Bailey 
as a creditor is relevant in that it clearly illustrates Calder's 
neglect and carelessness, even in his own personal bankruptcy. 
Calder's carelessness in his own case further supports the 
Panel's conclusion that Job's and Bailey's testimony as to 
Calder's neglect in their bankruptcies was credible evidence. 
Finally, Calder challenges this finding because he claims it 
fails to mention that Bailey's malpractice action against Calder 
was dismissed. That fact is irrelevant to this particular 
finding. Subsequent dismissal of the action did not relieve 
Calder from the obligation to list the claim in his bankruptcy 
schedules during the pendency of that malpractice action. 
Again, this Finding is supported by the substantial evidence 
in the record. 
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12. Finding No. l(o): 
Respondent's 1984 Chapter 13 case was dismissed by 
Judge Allen on July 31, 1986, as having been filed in 
bad faith. The court's order of dismissal is final and 
non-appealable. No credible evidence was presented to 
indicate that the dismissal of Respondent's 1984 
Chapter 13 was for reasons other than that it was filed 
in bad faith or that the Bankruptcy Court had any 
reason to dismiss the case other than on the merits as 
set forth in Judge Allen's ruling of July 30, 1986. 
Calder attacks this finding not because it is factually 
incorrect, but because the Panel admitted Judge Allen's ruling 
which, according to Calder, was contrary to In Re Strong, 616 
P.2d 583 (Ut. 1981). In reaching that conclusion, however, 
Calder misreads In Re Strong. The Court in In Re Strong held 
that a disciplinary panel was not bound by findings of another 
tribunal and should take evidence to make its own separate 
findings to determine whether a disciplinary rule had been 
violated. The Court went on to state that another court's 
findings are admissible as any other piece of evidence. In Re 
Strong does not require, as asserted by Calder, that the 
underlying transcript of the other tribunal's proceedings must be 
produced and admitted into evidence for the Panel to admit 
another tribunal's order. 
In making this finding, the Panel followed the holding of In 
Re Strong by admitting Judge Allen's ruling as evidence and 
weighting it as such. Judge Allen's order is simply one of the 
several underlying factors relative to the sanction and is also 
additional circumstantial evidence from which the Panel could 
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judge Calderfs competence and the credibility of Job's and 
Bailey1s claims of incompetence. The Panel's conclusions and 
recommendation of disbarment do not rest solely on Judge Allen's 
order; it is merely one piece of evidence. The fact of Judge 
Allen's order is correctly and accurately set forth in this 
finding. 
13. Finding No. l(p); 
Mr. Bailey was unable to obtain employment for a 
substantial period of time due to his inability to 
obtain a driver's license. 
This finding is based on absolutely uncontroverted testimony 
from Bailey. Tr., 56-61. Calder does not challenge the finding 
itself but rather argues that evidence ought to be excluded 
because again it does not comport his own subjective 
characterization of the evidence. Calder offers no legal or 
factual reason for striking this finding nor does he show it was 
entered arbitrarily or capriciously. The finding sets forth 
uncontroverted facts admitted in evidence. 
14. Finding No. 2(b): 
At the time Respondent agreed to file a Chapter 7 case 
for Mr. and Mrs. Job, Respondent knew that (1) Mr. Job 
was a plaintiff in a lawsuit entitled Job, et al. v. 
Pocklington, et al. which was then pending in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
Civil No. C82-1085C, (2) Mr. Job was seeking a 
substantial amount of money and damages, in excess of 
$1,000,000 in such suit, (3) the cause of action had to 
be listed as an asset in Job's Chapter 7 case, and (4) 
Job wanted the asset listed in his Chapter 7 case. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Respondent did not take 
reasonable steps and precautions to insure that this 
cause of action was properly scheduled and listed in 
Job's Chapter 7 case. 
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In challenging this finding, Calder fails to set forth Job's 
complete testimony which supports this finding. In fact, Calder 
11readily11 admitted his failure to include the Pocklington suit, 
in his Statement of the Case at Appellant's Brief, page 11. 
Job testified that in initially discussing the filing of a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy with Calder, he told Calder he was concerned 
about the bankruptcy interfering with the Pocklington suit 
because the lawsuit was so important to him. Tr., 143. Job then 
recalled Calderfs advice: 
And he said, told me, that generally there is a 90 
percent chance of the Court abandoning the 
lawsuits that I had and they wouldn't continue 
with the lawsuits—the lawsuit—and to think that 
we're talking about it right here. 
Therefore, Mr. Calder talked me basically 
into—or, assuring me that it would be all right 
and I would be able to go on with my federal 
lawsuit. 
Tr., 143, 1. 12-19. 
On cross-examination, Job then testified that he gave Calder 
the case number and case name. Tr., 199-200. Job also testified 
that the draft of the schedules he reviewed in Calder's office 
included the Pocklington suit and that he specifically checked 
for the lawsuit. Tr., 146-147. Nonetheless, it is uncontroverted 
that the bankruptcy schedules actually filed by Calder did not 
include the Pocklington suit. Tr., 148-149. 
Calder denied knowing anything about the Pocklington suit 
other than that Job had a "possible" claim. Calder further 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 53 
defended himself by asserting that any failure to list the 
appropriate information in the bankruptcy schedules was due to 
Jobfs failure to provide him with sufficient information about 
the Pocklington suit. Tr., 488-494, Calder admitted, however, 
that he may not have asked Job for further information or sought 
it out on his own, even though he was responsible for ensuring 
the accuracy of the information included in the schedules. Tr., 
488-494. 
Viewing the above evidence, including Calder's own 
admissions, in the light most favorable to the finding, the 
Panel's findings that Calder knew of the Pocklington suit and 
ff[n]ot withstanding this knowledge, [Calder] did not take 
reasonable steps and precautions to insure that this cause of 
action was properly scheduled and listed in Job's Chapter 7 
cases" are supported by the record. 
15. Finding No. 2(c): 
At the time Respondent recommended that Job file a 
Chapter 7, he did not discuss with Job the option of 
filing under Chapter 13, and did not mention any 
additional advantages which Job might realize if he 
elected to proceed under Chapter 13. 
Calder asserts that the "only evidence pertaining to this 
issue" is Calder's testimony and that his testimony "directly 
contradicts this finding." Appellant's Brief at p. 53. Though 
Calder acknowledges Job's testimony in his brief, the recitation 
of Job's testimony in Appellant's Brief is incomplete. Job 
testified that he did not have any conversations with Calder 
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about filing a Chapter 13 at the time he initially filed the 
Chapter 7 and that he only discussed a Chapter 13 with Calder 
later. Tr., 144, 1. 9-11. Job then testified that the Chapter 
13 was discussed at the time Job discovered the omitted 
Pocklington suit. Tr., 150-152. 
That evidence, viewed most favorably to this finding, 
clearly supports the finding. Calder insists upon taking a 
microscope to these findings as well as to the testimony, 
focusing only on the bold images within the narrow scope of that 
microscope. When reviewing the record, isolated testimony is not 
critical. The Panel is entitled to take the evidence, weigh it 
against the evidence in the record as a whole, determine 
credibility and make its findings accordingly. In this instance, 
the Panel did just that. The finding is neither arbitrary nor 
capricious. 
16. Finding No. 2(d): 
Subsequently, on or about April 27, 1984, Respondent, 
rather than seeking to amend the Chapter 7 schedules, 
filed a Chapter 13 proceeding, for which Mr. Job paid 
Respondent an additional $150.00, even though, in 
giving this advice, Respondent knew, or should have 
known, that: 
1) The Chapter 13 was likely to be dismissed as a 
"bad faith filing" in light of Job's previous discharge 
under Chapter 7; 
2) Job could not "save his home" under the 
Chapter 13 unless he had regular income with which to 
make payments; 
3) The Chapter 13 would be ineffective unless the 
previous discharge in the Chapter 7 were revoked or 
vacated; and 
4) Job would not obtain a discharge under his 
Chapter 13 case until he had successfully completed all 
payments under the plan. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 55 
With respect to this finding, Calder posits that the Panel 
explicitly found that it could not sanction Calder on the Chapter 
13 issue and that this finding is contrary to the oral statements 
of the Panel, This argument is a misreading of this particular 
finding. The Panel found that there was no clear and convincing , 
evidence to establish that the filing of the Job Chapter 13 was 
inappropriate or a violation of any disciplinary rules. Tr., 
1061. Pursuant to that, the Panel did not make any findings or 
conclusions in that regard. 
This particular finding, however, goes to the consequence of 
the filing in light of the circumstances of Job's prior Chapter 7 
and his absence of regular income. Judge Boulden's testimony, 
cited extensively by Calder at pages 55-57 of his Brief, is 
irrelevant to this particular finding because, as noted, this 
finding does not challenge the actual filing of Job's Chapter 13. 
Judge Boulder's testimony on cross-examination is relevant. 
Judge Boulden testified that in her Motion to Dismiss the Job 
Chapter 13 case she asserted as a basis for dismissal that Job 
had no regular income. Tr., 671-676. The significance of that 
testimony goes to Finding No. 2(d) subparagraph 2 where the Panel 
finds that Calder knew or should have known, and should have 
advised Job that one of his objectives - to save his home - could 
not be accomplished if he had no regular income to make payments 
under the Chapter 13 plan. It is undisputed that Job had no 
regular or prospective income at the time he filed the Chapter 
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13. Tr., 161-163. Thus, the finding simply conforms with Judge 
Boulden's testimony that Job's home could not be saved without 
regular income and a discharge could not be obtained without 
regular payments. 
Further, the real impact of the finding is that Calder knew 
or should have known that Jobfs prior Chapter 7 case would be 
revoked or vacated for the Chapter 13 to become effective; that 
finding at No. 2(d) is not challenged by Calder. Job had been 
clear with Calder that he did not want the Chapter 7 revoked; he 
merely wanted the Chapter 7 schedules amended to protect and 
include the Pocklington suit as an asset so opposing counsel in 
the Pocklington suit would not charge him with perjury and fraud. 
Tr., 147-153. 
Finally, Calder knew that Job could not obtain a Chapter 13 
discharge without completing payments under the plan and Calder 
clearly knew that Job had no regular income and no prospective 
future income with which to make payments. Tr., 423-438. 
Consequently, Finding No. 2(d)(4) is absolutely true and 
accurate. 
Again, Calder has failed to show that this finding is 
clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious. 
17. Finding No. 2(e): 
Respondent withdrew from representing Mr. Job in 
July 1984, without Mr. Jobfs consent and knowledge. 
At the time of his withdrawal Respondent knew that it 
would be difficult for Mr. Job to obtain substitute 
counsel to resist the Chapter 13 trustee's pending 
Motion for Dismissal. 
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This finding is supported by uncontroverted evidence. That 
Calder withdrew from representing Job in July 1984 and that Job 
only became aware of that withdrawal upon receipt of the same in 
the mail is undisputed. Tr., 160. Calder makes much of the fact 
that the testimony is confusing as to whether Job received the 
notice the first part or the latter part of July, 1984. This 
fact is quite irrelevant to the finding. 
What the evidence shows is that at the time Calder withdrew 
he knew the trustee, Judith Boulden, was filing a Motion to 
Dismiss Jobfs Chapter 13. Tr., 158; 439-440. In his notice to 
Job of his withdrawal, Calder did not advise Job of the Motion to 
Dismiss nor advise Job of any steps he should take to protect his 
interests. Tr., 160-161; Exhibit B-52. In fact, Calder did not 
even advise Job that he might want to seek the assistance of new 
counsel. Exhibit B-52. Calder knew at the time he withdrew that 
Job had no income or assets with which to retain new counsel and 
that Job would have difficulty finding counsel. Tr., 428-429. 
In fact, Job tried to resist Calder's withdrawal because he was 
unrepresented. Tr., 162; 429. Based on those uncontroverted 
facts, the Panel concluded that "at the time of his withdrawal 
[Calder] knew that it would be difficult for Job to obtain 
substitute counsel to resist the Chapter 13 Trustee's pending 
motion for dismissal." Finding No. 2(e). 
In his Appellant's Brief, Calder fails to identify the above 
evidence in the record supporting the Panel's finding; instead 
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Calder summarily concludes that no evidence exists to support the 
finding. That conclusion is simply without merit. 
18. Finding No. 2(g): 
On or about August 8, 1984, the Chapter 13 was 
dismissed and the Chapter 7 vacated, with the result 
that Mr. Job did not obtain any relief under either 
bankruptcy chapter. 
In challenging this finding, Calder not only engages in 
hairsplitting and semantics but again does not discuss any of the 
evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the 
finding. Calder merely suggests the finding is "misleading" and 
therefore erroneous because it fails to note that Job had the 
benefit of the Chapter 7 discharge for a "period of time". That, 
however, is irrelevant to the misconduct at issue. Calderfs 
inadequacy and neglect in omitting the Pocklington suit as an 
asset and then failing to appropriately follow through to correct 
that error is the issue. As this finding accurately sets forth, 
the consequence of Calder's conduct was that Job did not obtain 
any ultimate discharge of his debts and these debts were fully 
reinstated when the Chapter 13 was dismissed and the Chapter 7 
vacated in August 1984. Tr., 163. This finding reflects an 
uncontroverted fact. 
19. Finding No. 2(h): 
Thereafter, unable to afford new bankruptcy 
counsel, Mr. Job filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, pro se, 
in an attempt to prevent foreclosure proceedings on the 
Jobs' home; the Chapter 11 filing was late and the home 
was lost. 
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Calder attacks this finding by concluding that the Panel was 
attributing to Calder responsibility for the loss of Job's home. 
As with many of Calder's arguments, Calder attributes to the 
Panel a finding that was not made. As with his arguments, Calder 
interprets and restates the finding differently and then proceeds 
to knock it down by claiming no evidence exists in the record to 
support his interpretation. This finding is accurate and well 
supported by Job's testimony. Job did have difficulty retaining 
new counsel; he did file his Chapter 11 pro se and late; and he 
did lose his home as a result of a foreclosure sale. Tr., 
169-170. Again, those facts are uncontroverted. 
From the events which followed from Calderfs withdrawal, a 
reasonable inference can be drawn that Job's difficulty was due 
to Calder's improper withdrawal, leaving him without adequate 
protection of counsel. The Panel concluded that Calder's 
withdrawal violated DR 7-101(A)(3). See Conclusion No. 2(d). 
This finding does not, however, set forth the conclusion; this 
finding sets forth uncontroverted facts. Based on that, this 
finding is neither inaccurate nor does it draw any unreasonable 
inferences that are not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. 
20. Finding No. 2(j): 
At no time after July 1984 did Respondent seek to amend 
his 1984 personal Chapter 13 case to list Job as a 
creditor even though he knew that Job had claims 
against him for malpractice and had filed a lawsuit on 
September 11, 1984, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Civil No. C84-5436, asserting such claims. 
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This finding is not actually disputed by Calder and he 
admits that he did not amend his personal Chapter 13 to include 
the Job malpractice lawsuit until after Judge Frederick ruled in 
Job's favor awarding him damages in the principal sum of $55,000. 
Tr., 441-442. Calder merely argues his "justification" for 
failing to amend his Chapter 13. 
Though he argues to the contrary, Calder did have an 
incentive not to list Job as a creditor. The malpractice action 
would have been dealt with in the context of his Chapter 13 plan. 
That would have created the very real likelihood that the lawsuit 
would be adjudicated before Judge Allen in the bankruptcy court 
or that the bankruptcy court would have estimated the contingent 
claim for purposes of the Chapter 13 plan. It is reasonable to 
infer that Calder was taking a calculated risk and was forum 
shopping by having the malpractice lawsuit adjudicated in state 
court before Judge Frederick believing he would prevail. When 
Calder lost the malpractice action, he then sought to take 
advantage of the protection of his personal bankruptcy. Tr., 
175-176. Judge Frederick refused to stay the state court 
proceeding and the execution on the malpractice judgment at that 
late date. Tr., 176. Calder then sought relief directly through 
the bankruptcy court by first by filing a Chapter 13 in March 
1986, less than one month after the malpractice judgment was 
entered, and then by filing a Chapter 7 in August 1986. Judge 
Allen dismissed the Chapter 13 on May 12, 1986. Judge Allen 
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dismissed the Chapter 7 in September 1988. Ultimately, when the 
only method to prevent Job from executing on the malpractice 
judgment was to post a supersedeas cash bond of $55,000, Calder 
did so. Tr., 176-177; Exhibits B-30, B-32, B-33, B-37, B-38, 
B-39. 
The finding itself is accurate and uncontroverted. Hence, 
it is not clearly erroneous. Neither is it clearly erroneous for 
the Panel to have failed to include Calder's characterization of 
the undisputed facts. The circumstances and reasonable 
inferences from the evidence clearly support a different 
characterization than Calder asserts. 
21. Finding No. 2(k): 
On or about July 16, 1985, at a time Mr. Job was moving 
for Summary Judgment in the pending malpractice action, 
Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen Job's Chapter 11 
proceeding, solely with the intent to harass, injure 
and annoy Mr. Job; no valid basis existed for filing 
the motion and the motion asserted matters upon which 
Respondent had no basis to make such allegations; in 
that respect, Respondent knowingly and intentionally 
made the following false or misleading statements: 
1) That he was a creditor of Job when, in 
fact, he had never submitted a bill, previously 
demanded payment, or counterclaimed in the civil 
action for the payment of any attorney's fees; 
2) That the Jobs had intentionally omitted 
creditors from their Chapter 11 case when, in fact, 
Respondent knew that the claims of such creditors were 
contingent and disputed by the debtors; 
3) That the Jobs had omitted a debt to a 
family member in the amount of $3 5,000 when, in fact, 
Respondent had no reasonable basis for asserting such 
omission; 
4) That the debtor's Chapter 7 schedules 
filed in 1983 had shown a gross income in 1982 of 
$30,000 when, in fact, the income had been earned in 
1981; and 
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5) That the Jobs had omitted a substantial 
claim to the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of 
$5,000-$10,000 when, in fact, Respondent had no 
reasonable basis for making this assertion. 
Calder does not challenge the factual accuracy of this 
finding nor does he assert that the finding is not supported by 
the evidence in the record. Instead, Calder takes issue with the 
finding because "it ignores any mention of the justification 
advanced by Calder for the filing of the affidavit...." 
Appellant's Brief at page 65. It is the Panel's exclusive 
prerogative to reach ultimate conclusions as to whether conduct 
such as that set forth in this finding is a violation of 
disciplinary rules or whether such conduct supports any factors 
in aggravation which go to the sanction. 
In this instance, Calder did not introduce any evidence at 
the disciplinary trial showing he had a reasonable basis for 
making the allegations against Job in the Motion. The record 
contains uncontroverted evidence from Job that he did not have an 
outstanding debt to a family member of $35,000; that he did not 
omit an IRS claim; that the income of $30,000 was earned in 1981; 
and that, though Calder claimed to be a creditor of Job, Calder 
had never sent Job a bill, demanded payment of money or sued for 
any monies. Tr., 172-174; 447; 451. Despite Calder's assertion 
of some ethical obligation to file the Motion, no ethical 
obligation exists to provide a court with allegations which have 
no factual basis and which have not been adequately researched. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 63 
This finding is clearly supported by uncontroverted evidence 
in the record• 
22. Finding No. 2(m) and 2(n); 
2(m) In connection with the civil action entitled 
Job v. Calder, Civil No. C84-5436, filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, Respondent filed an Affidavit on or about July 
18, 1985, wherein Respondent knowingly and 
intentionally made the following misstatements and 
accusations: 
1) That Job was responsible for failing to 
list the lawsuit in his schedules when, in fact, 
Respondent admits that when Job signed the 
schedules, the lawsuit was listed as an asset; 
2) That there was Msome reason to think that 
the debtor may have stolen a key from the 
attorney's desk drawer while he was alone in the 
office and entered the office at night and effected 
certain changes [sic] original document that was to 
be filed with the Court11 when, in fact, Respondent 
had no facts upon which to base this accusation. 
Respondent also stated: "Another theory is Mr. Job 
had access to defendant's office and perpetrated a 
fraud upon everybody by substituting a false paper 
in the papers to be filed with the Court", and 
3) That, by insinuation and implication, Job 
had tampered with the official files maintained by 
the Bankruptcy Court when, in fact, Respondent had 
no basis in fact to make any such insinuation or 
accusation. 
2(n) The Panel finds those defenses, accusations, 
and insinuations made by Respondent against Job to be 
spurious and indicative of an attitudes of bad faith 
which pervades Respondent's conduct in connection with 
the Utah State Bar disciplinary proceedings and the 
court proceedings. 
Finding 2(m) is uncontroverted as can be seen from the 
affidavit itself. Exhibit B-50. Calder presented no evidence at 
trial establishing that he had any factual basis for asserting 
that Job stole Calder's office key and changed the schedules or 
that Job had access to Calder's office and substituted false 
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papers thereby perpetuating a fraud. Tr., 420-423. The evidence 
is to the contrary: Job believed that his most important asset 
was the Pocklington suit, and he communicated that fact to 
Calder. Job specifically checked on the "working" papers to make 
sure the lawsuit was listed. Tr., 143-144. Calder did not 
dispute nor controvert that evidence. On the other hand, Calder 
had every reason to pass the blame on to Job and was obviously 
attempting to do so. 
Contributing to the Panel's finding of intent in Finding 2(m) 
was Calderfs admission at trial that he intended for the court to 
rely on his affidavit in ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Tr., 421. Calder's speculation in his Appellant's Brief that the 
trial court did not attach any weight to the affidavit is 
irrelevant to the issue of Calder's misconduct. Calder intended 
for the court to rely on it. 
From those circumstances, the Panel could and did reasonably 
infer that the misstatements and accusations in the affidavit 
were knowing and intentional. From those same circumstances, the 
Panel could and did reasonably infer that Calder's "defenses, 
accusations and insinuations...against Job...(were) spurious and 
indicative of an attitude of bad faith..." as set forth in 
Finding No. 2(n). 
As to Finding 2(n), the evidence in the record clearly 
supports the finding. First, the Panel had the opportunity to 
observe Calder and assess demeanor and credibility during 5 days 
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of trial over a 2 1/2 month period. The Panel observed Calder 
testify on no less than four occasions: direct examination by 
Mr. Leta and cross-examination by Mr. Boone; direct examination 
by Mr. Boone and cross-examination by Mr. Leta. Under the ABA 
Standards for Imposing Lawer Sanctions, Section 9.22(f), a 
disciplinary panel may consider in aggravation "deceptive 
practices during the disciplinary process." Finding Calder to 
have conducted himself in bad faith during the course of the 
disciplinary proceeding is certainly appropriate. 
Calder asserts that it was improper for the Panel to 
generalize that Calderfs attitude of bad faith pervaded Calderfs 
"conduct in connection with the Utah State Bar disciplinary 
proceedings and the court proceedings." Calder, however, cites 
no authority for that proposition nor does he give any rationale 
why it is improper. 
The evidence discussed above clearly supports that fact that 
Calder1s accusations against Job were without any factual basis. 
Calder was attempting to escape liability in the malpractice 
action by inappropriate and unethical conduct. From the evidence 
the Panel could clearly and reasonably infer Calder's bad faith 
in both the bar and court proceedings. Findings 2(m) and (n) are 
neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
23. Finding No. 2(o): 
After Judge Frederick orally rendered his judgment 
in the Job malpractice action in favor of Mr. Job, and 
before the formal judgment was entered on February 24, 
1986, Respondent transferred a substantial portion of 
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his property to his wife and brother• Such transfers 
are the subject of pending adversary proceedings by 
Respondent's Chapter 7 trustee to set aside such 
transfers as fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
This finding is not challenged by Calder as being erroneous. 
It is undisputed. These facts were appropriately admitted into 
evidence by the Panel and weighed as any other evidence. This 
finding is simply another circumstance supporting the Panel's 
conclusion that Calder acted in bad faith with respect to his 
clients, Job and Bailey, and in this instance, particularly Job. 
In attacking this finding, Calder merely recharacterizes the 
finding by suggesting that the Panel used the pendency of the 
appeal proceedings as a basis for the recommended discipline of 
disbarment. Nowhere in the findings or conclusions is such a 
statement made by the Panel. 
Pursuant to In Re Strong, 616 P.2d at 583, the evidence of 
the court proceedings may be admitted and weighed as any other 
evidence. Even though a disciplinary panel cannot rely solely on 
another tribunal's findings, the Panel need not wait for the 
outcome of the pending appeal because they are not bound by the 
decision of the court. In this instance, the fact of the 
transfer of assets is not disputed. Calder himself admitted 
making those transfers. Tr., 400-403. The Panel may certainly 
use that circumstance along with its other findings to conclude 
that Calder acted in bad faith. 
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Again, the facts set forth in this finding are undisputed. 
Calderfs only objection again goes to the Panel's failure to 
include facts which support his characterization of the evidence. 
24. Finding No. 3: 
Respondent filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
proceeding in 1986 in bad faith and it was dismissed by 
the ruling of Judge Allen made on May 12, 1986, which 
ruling is now final and non-appealable. Respondent did 
not file his 1986 Chapter 13 case until March 12, 1986, 
after entry of the judgment in favor of Job in the 
civil case and after Respondent failed to post a 
supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of the judgment 
during the pendency of his appeal. Respondent's 
interest in filing the Chapter 13 also was to frustrate 
the claims of Job and Bailey. 
The facts set forth in this finding are again undisputed. 
Calder's attack on this finding is focused on the admission of 
Judge Allen's ruling, the lack of support in the record for a 
finding of intent, and the fact that the Panel failed to include 
Calder's characterization of the evidence. As noted previously, 
the Panel admitted Judge Allen's May 12, 1986, ruling consistent 
with In Re Strong. 
In Re Strong does not require introduction of the underlying 
transcript in the other tribunal's proceeding as a prerequisite 
or foundation for introducing a judge's decision as evidence. 
The Panel may admit the judge's ruling, weigh and rely on it as 
any other piece of evidence. While In Re Strong does hold that a 
Panel may not rely exclusively on a judge's ruling, this record 
is clear that the Panel received and admitted evidence well 
beyond Judge Allen's ruling; the Panel's conclusions as to 
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disciplinary rule violations do not rest solely on another 
tribunal's findings or order. 
In this particular finding, the Panel used Judge Allen's 
ruling of May 12, 1986, along with other circumstances which are 
set forth in the finding to conclude that Calder's "interest in 
filing the Chapter 13 also was to frustrate the claims of Job and 
Bailey." Finding No. 3. Those other circumstances include the 
timing of Calder's filing of his various bankruptcies after the 
Job malpractice judgment was entered. 
Calder next objects to the fact that "the Panel ignored 
Calderfs explanation" of the filing of his bankruptcies. 
Appellant's Brief at 70. As has been noted on several prior 
occasions, the Panel is not bound by Calder's conclusions, 
justifications, explanations or characterizations of the facts. 
Such failure does not constitute error on the Panel's part. 
Finally, in suggesting that the finding is erroneous because 
it fails to reflect Calder's posting of a $55,000 supersedeas 
bond in November 1988, Calder fails to disclose that the filing 
of that bond came only after Calder exhausted every other effort 
to prevent Job from executing on the judgment. See Exhibit B-32; 
B-37; B-38 and B-39. Only then did he take an appeal from the 
denial of a discharge in his Chapter 7 and post the supersedeas 
bond. That was the only remaining avenue to stay execution on 
the malpractice judgment. 
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Calder has again failed in his burden. The evidence clearly 
shows that the finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
25. Finding No. 4: 
When Respondent filed his statement of affairs in 
his 1986 Chapter 7 case, he knowingly and intentionally 
filed a statement for a debtor f,not engaged in 
business11 when, in fact, Respondent knew, at such time, 
that he was engaged in business. 
Calder himself admitted the facts set forth in this finding. 
Tr., 598. The fact that Calderfs trustee in bankruptcy was not 
confused by the form used by Calder is irrelevant. This finding 
is further evidence of Calder's carelessness in filing bankruptcy 
forms and schedules. That fact gives credibility to Job's and 
Bailey's claims of neglect and carelessness against Calder. 
26. Finding No. 5: 
Respondent also filed in 1986 a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy action wherein the assets listed are 
substantially less than those assets listed in either 
Respondent's 1984 or 1986 Chapter 13 schedules. 
Respondent had not made any significant transfers of 
assets between the filing of his 1986 Chapter 13 and 
his 1986 Chapter 7. 
This finding is clearly supported by the evidence. Calder 
himself admitted at trial that the assets listed in his 1986 
Chapter 7 were substantially less than the assets listed in 
either his 1984 or 1986 Chapter 13 schedules. Tr., 388-403. 
Nevertheless, Calder challenges this finding because it does 
not reflect Calder's "explanation" of why the bankruptcy 
schedules show such a discrepancy. Calder also asserts that the 
finding implies fraudulent conduct on the part of Calder. This 
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finding does not set forth that Calder engaged in fraudulent 
conduct, Calder is once again recrafting the finding so he can 
show that his recrafted finding is unsupported by the evidence. 
A careful review of Calder*s bankruptcy schedules shows the 
differences in the listing of the assets in the various cases. 
Even accepting Calderfs explanations for the discrepancies in 
the listing of assets, the Panel could reasonably conclude that 
Calder was careless in preparing his own personal bankruptcy 
cases, thereby giving credibility to Job's and Bailey's claims. 
The Panel also could reasonably conclude that Calder had a reason 
for reducing his assets in 1986 and for being "more precise11. 
After all, it was on February 24, 1986, that Judge Frederick 
entered a malpractice judgment of $55,000 against Calder. 
Exhibit B-36. It is not an unreasonable inference from those 
undisputed facts that Calder's conduct was an attempt to avoid 
paying the malpractice judgment. 
In any event, this finding does not postulate any conclusions 
or inferences. The finding sets forth facts which are 
uncontroverted. 
27. Finding No. 6; 
Respondent was denied a general discharge in his 
Chapter 7 case by the Memorandum Decision of Judge 
Allen entered on or about September 17, 1988, wherein 
the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
Respondent's failure to list certain assets in his 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy was "knowing and fraudulent." 
Calder again relies on an inappropriate application of In Re 
Strong in challenging this finding. The finding itself is 
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uncontroverted: Calder was denied a general discharge in his 
Chapter 7 case and the bankruptcy court found fraudulent conduct. 
Exhibit B-39. The Panel properly admitted that order as evidence 
of Calder's state of mind. From that followed the conclusion 
that Calder pursued his personal bankruptcies to frustrate Job's 
malpractice claim. This finding does not stand alone in 
supporting the Panel's conclusions; it is only one circumstance 
among many. .See, e.g. , Finding Nos. 2(m), 2(n), 2(o), and 3, 
which pertain to the juxtapositioning of Calderfs bankruptcy 
cases with entry of the malpractice judgment. 
This finding is uncontroverted; Calder has shown no error on 
the part of the Panel in making this finding. 
28. Finding No. 7: 
By an order entered on or about November 18, 1988, 
Respondent was denied the right to convert his Chapter 
7 case to a Chapter 13 case "in order to prevent [an] 
abuse of bankruptcy process." 
Calder complains that this finding is beyond the scope of the 
formal complaints. As previously noted, however, Calder's 
personal bankruptcies, including the Chapter 7, were specifically 
alleged in the Job Formal Complaint (F-274). This finding simply 
sets forth the conduct of Calder in relation to those 
bankruptcies. In addition, as previously rioted, Calder made no 
objection at the trial to this evidence. He had ample 
opportunity to meet that evidence in his defense, particularly 
since the five-day trial spanned a two-month period. Calder has 
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made no showing of prejudice, nor has he shown that he was unable 
to present a full defense at trial to meet this evidence. 
The facts set forth in this finding are again uncontroverted. 
29. Finding No. 8: 
Considering the time frame of Respondent's several 
bankruptcies and the great disparity in assets between 
filings and considering the fact that Respondent's 
primary creditor in 1986 was Dennis Job with his 
malpractice judgment of approximately $55,000 + 
interest, Respondent was engaged either in actual fraud 
or an attempt to defraud creditors. 
The circumstances underlying this finding are uncontroverted: 
the time frame of Calder's several bankruptcies; that Calder's 
primary creditor in 1986 was Job with his malpractice judgment of 
$55,000; and that there were disparities in assets between the 
bankruptcy filings prior to the entry of the malpractice judgment 
and the bankruptcy filings subsequent to the award of the 
malpractice judgment. Tr., 388-403; Exhibits B-30, B-32; B-36 to 
B-39. The Panel reasonably inferred therefrom that Calder was 
engaged in fraud or an attempt to defraud. A trier of fact in 
determining state of mind must infer intent from circumstantial 
evidence. Rarely does the defendant testify that he owns the 
"smoking gun" and "pulled the trigger." This finding is neither 
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Calder has made no showing that it 
is clearly erroneous nor has he even attempted to discuss the 
evidence supporting this finding. 
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30. Finding No. 10: 
Respondent stipulated to a private reprimand in 
1983 in a matter involving approximately 20 different 
client matters. 
This finding is clearly supported by Exhibits B-40 and B-52 
and is included to support the factors found by the Panel 
relative to the sanction. In determining an appropriate 
sanction, the Panel may consider prior discipline imposed on the 
attorney. The prior formal complaint (Exhibit B-40) and the 
Stipulation of Discipline (Exhibit B-52) are pleadings arising 
from that prior disciplinary matter. The Panel is entitled to 
take judicial notice of prior disciplinary matter just as a court 
may take judicial notice of pleadings and orders filed in another 
case. Bar Counsel is not required to prove the underlying merits 
of the prior disciplinary matter since the prior discipline is a 
final, fully adjudicated decision. Otherwise, prior discipline 
cases would be retried in each subsequent discipline matter. 
This finding is well within the scope of the Panel's 
authority. 
C. SUMMARY 
Calder?s challenge to the majority of the findings does not 
reflect even a good faith attempt to marshall the evidence in 
support of the findings, to discuss the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the finding, and then to assert a legitimate reason, 
legal or factual, for the evidence failing to support the 
finding. More often than not, Calder has simply reargued the 
evidence to conform to his characterizations and has ignored the 
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clear and often uncontroverted evidence supporting the finding. 
In attacking other findings, Calder has simply recrafted the 
finding and then argued that no evidence exists in the record to 
support the recrafted finding. In some cases, Calder creates an 
inference from the finding that the Panel did not make and then 
proceeds to argue that no evidence supports that inference. 
Finally, Calder challenges findings not because they were 
unsupported by the evidence but rather because they do not set 
forth his alleged justification for his conduct. 
Calder attempts to unravel the totality of the findings by 
focusing on minuscule details of each separate finding and then 
discussing isolated evidence often consisting of his own 
testimony which is nothing more than his subjective 
characterization of the facts or his excuse for his often 
unambiguous conduct. Calderfs arguments are an attempt to focus 
this Court on the trees in the hope it will not see the forest. 
The Panel and the Board saw the forest clearly: Calderfs conduct 
in his representation of Bailey and Job and in his personal use 
of bankruptcy falls so far short of acceptable professional 
standards that Calder ought not be allowed to practice law in 
this State. The evidence taken as a whole clearly and 
convincingly supports that recommendation. 
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V. THE PANEL ADMITTED AND CONSIDERED EVIDENCE RELATING TO 
MITIGATION BUT FOUND THAT NO MITIGATING FACTORS WERE 
ESTABLISHED. 
Calder argues that three facts or circumstances should have 
been found by the Panel to be mitigating factors. These three 
facts presuppose, however, that the Panel adopted Calder's 
characterization of the evidence. First, Calder argues that the 
fact that he "volunteered" to assist Bailey in amending his 
bankruptcy schedules is a factor in mitigation. The finding and 
supporting evidence determined by the Panel to be most credible 
does not support the conclusion that Calder "volunteered." 
Calder's 1983 affidavit filed in the Bailey malpractice action 
admits that he agreed to assist Bailey at the Bar's request. 
Exhibit B-26. Calderfs agreement to assist Bailey came after 
Bailey complained to the Bar and after Bailey had no success in 
dealing directly with Calder. To assert that the Panel's failure 
to include that as mitigation is a bootstrap argument. 
Second, Calder argues that his posting of the supersedeas 
bond in November 1988 is a mitigating factor. Again, as 
previously discussed, the posting of the bond came only after 
Calder had unsuccessfully exhausted all efforts to stay execution 
of the judgment. Filing the bond was to protect Calder's own 
interests. It allowed him to pursue his appeal of Judge Allen's 
September 27, 1988, decision while preventing Job from executing 
on the malpractice judgment. The Panel did not err in not 
finding that factor in mitigation. 
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Third, Calder argues that the Panel should have found that 
the findings were tenuous in nature and as such, a mitigating 
factor. That argument is ludicrous on its face. The Panel 
obviously did not believe its findings were tenuous after 
laboring through five days of trial and then through its 
extensive deliberations. 
The Panel took evidence and argument and considered whether 
factors existed relative to mitigation, but found that no such 
factors were established. Tr., Vol. VII, p. 8 and 160-161. 
VI. THE PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION OF DISBARMENT IS PROPORTIONATE TO 
THE ETHICAL VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY CALDER. 
The Panel found that Calder committed 15 violations of the 
disciplinary rules. Those fifteen (15) violations involve 
conduct which is central to an attorney's fitness to practice and 
to the required character of any attorney. 
The Panel found that Calder carelessly and negligently 
represented Bailey and Job in their bankruptcies. In doing so, 
Calder failed to take responsibility for his own errors and to 
correct them, which the Panel found he could easily have done. 
In attempting to escape responsibility for his conduct, Calder 
intentionally lied to three courts on separate occasions by 
filing false affidavits and a Motion in Job's Chapter 11 case 
which alleged false facts. Such conduct was also intended to 
harass and injure Bailey and Job in their efforts to seek relief. 
As a result of Calder's gross neglect and incompetence, he 
intentionally prejudiced his clients' interests: Bailey was 
unable to renew his driver's license from 1979 to 1988; Job did 
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not receive a discharge of his debts, lost his home and has never 
been able to collect his malpractice judgment of $55,000. 
The Panel also found that in avoiding responsibility for his 
clients1 interests, he abused the bankruptcy process by filing 
personal bankruptcies which intentionally omitted assets and 
which were improperly intended to prevent Job from collecting his 
malpractice judgment. Calder also transferred personal assets 
for the same purpose. 
Calder's dishonesty in making representations to the court 
and dealing with his personal assets, his abuse of the legal 
process, his abuse of his clients, his entrenched refusal to take 
responsibility for his own conduct, and his demonstrated gross 
neglect in handling his clients' legal matters evidence such a 
defective character as an attorney that Calder presents a present 
and continuing danger to the public, a danger that can only be 
eliminated by Calder's disbarment. 
Those conclusions are clearly supported by the record. In 
fact, Calder does not challenge any of the conclusions of law 
entered by the Panel. 
In recommending disbarment, the Panel found several 
additional factors in aggravation. The Panel found that Calder 
Since the disciplinary trial concluded in January 1989, 
Dennis Job passed away due to a known heart condition. 
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placed the blame on his clients for the problems they had in 
their bankruptcies. Further, the Panel found that the clients 
were particularly vulnerable since the assistance they sought was 
in a highly specialized area and they relied on Calder as a self 
styled expert in bankruptcy. The Panel concluded that Calder 
could have addressed his clients' problems at the outset but 
refused to do so. And finally, the Panel found that Calder's 
misconduct continued over a decade during which time he displayed 
a dishonest and selfish motive in filing his personal 
bankruptcies, in filing false affidavits in the Job and Bailey 
malpractice actions and in his inappropriate handling of both the 
Job and Bailey bankruptcies. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Recommendation of Discipline at pp. 20-22. 
The Panel's findings and conclusions amply support the 
recommendation of disbarment. As noted by the Panel, Calderfs 
conduct clearly demonstrates that he is incapable of conforming 
his professional behavior to the minimum standard required of 
practicing attorneys in this State. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of 
Discipline and enter an order disbarring Calder from the practice 
of law in the State of Utah. 
Dated this l^T day of (QfHJUMUVaOlr , 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL 
By: ^ T k ^ N f V V ^ Sub>-i 
Christine A. Burdick 
Bar Counsel 
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Sp&qial Bar Counsel 
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APPENDIX I 
A. Affidavit of Phil Himmelberger 
B. Affidavit of Barton Blackstok 
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Civil No. C35-300 
COMES NOV/, affiant, and under oath, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. That I am the manager of Driver 
Improvement/Financial Responsibility for the State of Utah 
and as such, it is my responsibility to implement the 
statutes and policies of the Department, including those 
statutes commonly known as the Safety Responsibility Act set 
forth in Sec, 41-12-1, etc-, Utah Code Annotated. 
2. Based upon the case of Perez V. Campbell, 402 U.S. 
637 (1971), it is our policy that a discharge in Bankruptcy 
of any judgment as defined by 41-12-13 and 41-12-15 of Utah 
Code Annotated will relieve the judgment debtor from any 
requirements of this act and such judgment will no longer 
operate to deny the judgment debtor a drivers license or 
driving privileges. 
3. The records of this Department Indicate that the 
above-named individual, Ernest L. Bailey, applied for a Utah 
drivers license on March 19, 1979, However, his 
application was denied as a result of an unsatisfied 
judgment that had been rendered against him in regards to a 
motor vehicle accident. 
4. This Department received notice from the United 
States District Court that Mr. Bailey was amending his 
bankruptcy to include the unsatisfied judgment on March 2S, 
1979, which was after he had applied for a license. 
5. If the unsatisfied judgment had been included on 
his bankruptcy in 1978, Mr. Bailey would have been issued a 
Utah drivers license on March 19, 1979. And Further, if the 
unsatisfied judgment would have been added to his bankruptcy 
on March 28, 1979, he could of obtainea his Utah drivers 
license immediately thereafter. 
6. I have been the manager of Driver Improvement 
since July of 1979. 





SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s O Q ^ day of 
'22&£L——> 1986' 
J? - ? 
sNOTArtYPUBUIC 
Residing in: 
My Commission Expires: V', x _.-y^^ /^?
 7 
R e C E | V e o 
JUN l ]o89 
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Attorney at Law 
32 Exchange Place #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6G86 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




RICHARD CALDER, Civil No- C85-800 
Defendant, 
COMES NOW, affiant, and under oath, deposes and states 
as follows: 
1. That I am the assistant manager of Driver 
Improvement/Financial Responsibility for the State of Utah 
and as such, it is my responsibility to implement the 
statutes and policies of the department, including those 
statutes commonly known as the Safety Responsibility Act set 
forth in Sec- 41-12-1, etc-, Utah Code Annotated. 
2. Based upon the case of Perez V. Campbell, 402 U.S. 
637 (1971), it is our policy that a discharge in Bankruptcy 
of any judgment as defined by 41-12-13 and 41-12-15 of Utah 
Code Annotated will relieve the judgment debtor from any 
requirements of this act and such judgment will no longer 
operate to deny the judgment debtor a drivers license or 
driving privileges. 
Dated this 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
'''"'/y) t'.t-f , 1986. 
day of 
i 
/ - , , . . 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in: 
v ^  
./ 
My Commission Expires: 
